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This paper uses job seekers’ elicited beliefs about job finding to disentangle the sources of the decline
in job-finding rates by duration of unemployment. We document that beliefs have strong predictive
power for job finding, but are not revised downward when remaining unemployed and are subject to
optimistic bias, especially for the long-term unemployed. Leveraging the predictive power of beliefs,
we find substantial heterogeneity in job finding with the resulting dynamic selection explaining most
of the observed negative duration dependence in job finding. Moreover, job seekers’ beliefs under-react
to heterogeneity in job finding, distorting search behavior and increasing long-term unemployment.
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1 Introduction
A critical challenge for unemployment policy is the high incidence of long-term unemployment. While
long unemployment durations and a large share of long-term unemployed have been a common phe-
nomenon in European countries (see Ljungqvist and Sargent [1998] and Machin and Manning [1999]),
the Great Recession has imported this concern to the US as well (Kroft et al. [2016]) and it is likely to
be reinforced given the sharp increase in unemployment following the COVID-19 pandemic. The conse-
quences of job loss can be large, but especially so for people who get stuck in long spells of unemployment
(e.g., Jacobson et al. [1993], Kolsrud et al. [2018]). Moreover, the high incidence of long-term unem-
ployment seems indicative of substantial frictions in the search and matching process (e.g., Clark and
Summers [1979]) and can contribute to the persistence of employment shocks (e.g., Pissarides [1992]).
A ubiquitous empirical finding in the literature is the observed depreciation in job-finding rates by
duration of unemployment. As it is crucial for formulating policy responses, understanding why em-
ployment prospects are worse for the long-term unemployed has been the topic of a long literature.1 In
theory, long-term unemployment may reduce a worker’s chances to find a job (e.g., due to skill depre-
ciation or duration-based employer screening), but less employable workers also select into long-term
unemployment. Empirically, separating the role of duration-dependent forces from heterogeneity across
job seekers has been a challenge until today. Since the seminal work by Lancaster [1979] and Heckman
and Singer [1984] among others, several studies have tried to estimate or calibrate the contribution of
different forces to the observed negative duration dependence in exit rates out of unemployment. Direct
evidence on the potential role of heterogeneity has been particularly limited.2
This paper takes a novel approach to address this question, using newly available data on unem-
ployed job seekers’ perceptions about their employment prospects together with actual labor market
transitions. We present a conceptual framework that takes advantage of our ability to jointly observe job
seekers’ perceptions and actual job finding to identify heterogeneity in true job-finding rates and sepa-
rate dynamic selection from true duration dependence in explaining the observed decline in job finding.
The key idea underlying identification in this framework is that the covariance between perceptions and
actual job finding helps uncovering the extent of ex-ante heterogeneity in true job-finding probabilities.
The predictable variation in job finding provides a lower bound on the ex-ante heterogeneity in job
finding. Beliefs can also be used in combination with a model that relates job seekers’ elicited beliefs
to their job-finding probability to estimate the heterogeneity in the latter. This builds on recent work
using risk elicitations to estimate heterogeneity in ex-ante risks in Hendren [2013, 2017].
Our analysis goes further in two important dimensions. Both are key to uncover the heterogeneity
in job finding that contributes to the observed duration dependence and are relevant by themselves.
First, in addition to idiosyncratic error in the beliefs (Hendren [2013]), we allow job seekers’ beliefs to
systematically over- or under-react to differences in job finding, either across job seekers or over the
1See Shimer and Werning [2006], Pavoni [2009] and Kolsrud et al. [2018] for the consequences for the design of the
unemployment benefit profile. See Pavoni and Violante [2007], Spinnewijn [2013] and Wunsch [2013] for the consequences
on the design of workfare, job search assistance and training programs.
2For a review of the relevant literature, see Machin and Manning [1999] who write: ‘To conclude, it does not really seem
possible in practice to identify separately the effect of heterogeneity from that of [true] duration dependence without making
some very strong assumptions about functional form which have no foundation in any economic theory.’ See Kroft et al.
[2013], Alvarez et al. [2016], Jarosch and Pilossoph [2018] and Farber et al. [2018] for recent examples in this literature.
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unemployment spell. This bias affects the covariance between perceptions and job finding and thus helps
uncovering the heterogeneity in job finding from that covariance. We identify this bias by leveraging
variation in job-finding rates at different unemployment durations. Second, we allow for transitory
differences in job seekers’ job finding within a spell (e.g., temporary spells of reduced search, vacancy
supply shocks), which do not contribute to the observed decline in job-finding rates through dynamic
selection. We show that we can separately identify permanent and transitory differences in job finding
using the covariances between job finding and contemporaneous vs. lagged beliefs.
We turn to the data to estimate the relevant moments in our conceptual framework and document
a number of novel facts about job seekers’ perceptions. We use two distinct surveys, which elicited
unemployed job seekers’ beliefs about their chances of re-employment - which we thus refer to as the
elicited or perceived job-finding probability. The first survey is the Survey of Consumer Expectations
(SCE), which started in December 2012 and is run by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
survey has a rotating panel structure where a representative sample of about 1,300 household heads is
interviewed every month for a period of up to 12 months (see Armantier et al. [2017] for details). The
second survey is the Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey, which surveyed a large sample of
unemployment insurance recipients in NJ every week from October 2009 to March 2010 (see Krueger
and Mueller [2011] for details). A crucial feature of our data is its longitudinal nature, which allows to
compare reported perceptions to ex-post realizations as well as to analyze the evolution of perceptions
over the spell of unemployment for the same individuals. Both surveys also elicited job seekers’ beliefs
about job finding at different horizons and/or in different ways, so we can study robustness to the
elicitation method and use multiple measurements to reduce elicitation error (Morrison and Taubinsky
[2019]).
The empirical analysis provides three main results. First, the perceived job-finding probabilities
significantly and strongly predict actual job finding at the individual level. This holds even when we
control for a rich set of observable co-variates. In the SCE, the actual job-finding rate is around 0.5
percentage points higher for individuals who report their job-finding probability to be 1 percentage
point higher. Moreover, we find that the covariances of job finding with contemporaneous vs. lagged
beliefs are of similar size, suggestive of the persistence in job seekers’ prospects. We use the empirical
correlation between beliefs and job finding to inform non-parametric bounds, which indicate substantial
heterogeneity in job finding that can explain at least half of the observed decline in job finding.
Second, comparing the perceived and actual job finding across job seekers, we confirm in our data
Spinnewijn’s (2015) finding of an overall optimistic bias, but furthermore, we find that the bias rises
strongly with unemployment duration. In the SCE, the elicited beliefs are in fact unbiased for job seekers
at the start of the unemployment spell, but the observed decline in perceived job-finding probabilities
is only half of the observed decline in actual job-finding rates. Hence, the long-term unemployed
substantially over-estimate their probability of finding a job. We use the under-reaction in beliefs to
inform our model of beliefs, and find that – combined with the high covariance between beliefs and job
finding – it suggests that potentially all of the observed declined in job finding can be explained by
dynamic selection.
Third, when using only within-person variation, we find that, if anything, job seekers report slightly
higher job-finding probabilities the longer they are unemployed. This result is perhaps surprising, given
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the large empirical literature trying to identify the true duration dependence in job finding and often ar-
guing that it is negative. It is consistent, however, with our reduced-form analysis that finds substantial
heterogeneity in job finding, thus leaving limited scope for true negative duration dependence.
To jointly estimate the heterogeneity and dynamics of the true and perceived job-finding rates, we
propose a statistical model that allows us to infer the parameters of interest with exact equivalents of
the moments in the data. Our model can allow for a differential response of beliefs to cross-sectional and
longitudinal variation in job finding, using both changes in the means of perceived and true job finding
and their covariances over the spell. We prove the semi-parametric identification of a stylized two-period
version of the model and verify that the identification arguments hold up in the estimation of the fully-
specified dynamic model, showing how parameter estimates change with the empirical moments.
The estimates from our statistical model confirm the substantial heterogeneity in true job-finding
rates, accounting for almost all of the observed decline in job-finding rates over the spell of unemployment
(84.7 percent; s.e. 36.4). True duration dependence explains the remainder and thus plays a limited
role, also in comparison to the importance it has been attributed in prior work. In line with the reduced-
form evidence, the pre-dominant role played by dynamic selection proves to be robust to alternative
distributional and functional-form assumptions in the statistical model. The estimation also confirms
the under-response of job seekers’ beliefs to variation in job finding. Job seekers with a high underlying
job-finding rate tend to be over-pessimistic, whereas job seekers with a low job-finding rate are over-
optimistic. The latter remain unemployed longer, but they do not revise their beliefs downward. In the
absence of true duration dependence in job finding, this explains why the long-term unemployed are
over-optimistic. Our statistical framework is parsimoniously specified but fits the key moments in our
data very well, whereas restricted versions of the model perform radically worse.
We finally study how the under-reaction in job seekers’ perceptions itself can contribute to the
observed decline in job finding and the incidence of long-term unemployment. To this purpose, we set
up a job search model à la McCall [1970], introducing heterogeneity and true duration dependence in
job-offer rates and allowing for biased beliefs. The key mechanism that we highlight in this structural
model is that job seekers’ behavior mitigates the mechanical effect of differences in job offer rates on
job-finding rates, but only when these differences are perceived as such. If perceptions under-respond
to differences in job-offer rates, either across job seekers or over the unemployment spell, the resulting
differences in job-finding rates will be amplified. The larger variation in job finding leads to a stronger
decline in the observed job finding. To quantify the impact on the incidence of long-term unemployment,
we calibrate the model with moments from our data and the statistical model. Correcting the biases in
beliefs reduces the share of workers who are unemployed for longer than 6 months, by 2− 3 percentage
points. Defining the incidence of long-term unemployment as the ratio of the LT vs. ST unemployment
rate, we find that the biases in beliefs jointly explain 11− 12% of this incidence.
Our paper aims to contribute to three different strands in the literature. As discussed before, we
contribute to the large literature studying the different sources of observed duration dependence in
job finding. We use a novel strategy to separate dynamic selection due to heterogeneity in job-finding
probabilities from true duration dependence, finding a pre-dominant role played by dynamic selection.
Recent resume audit studies (e.g., Kroft et al. [2013]) have documented large declines in callback rates
over the unemployment the spell, suggesting the importance of true duration dependence instead. The
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evidence from audit studies themselves, however, is mixed (see Farber et al. [2018]) and the duration
dependence in callback rates may not translate into duration dependence in job finding (e.g., Jarosch
and Pilossoph [2018]). Alvarez et al. [2016] use data on multiple unemployment spells instead and find
evidence for positive true duration dependence.3 In general, direct evidence on the role of heterogeneity
has been limited to the dynamic selection in longer unemployment spells based on observables, which
tend to play a moderate role only (e.g., Kroft et al. [2016]).
Second, our analysis of the biases in beliefs relates to a strand in the behavioral labor economics
literature trying to understand the role of information frictions and behavioral biases in the job search
process. The new survey evidence confirms the optimistic bias in job seekers’ beliefs (Spinnewijn [2015],
Arni [2017], Conlon et al. [2018]) and the persistence in beliefs seems consistent with the lack of updating
of reservation wages (Krueger and Mueller [2016], Drahs et al. [2018]) and the constant or even increasing
profile of search activity over the unemployment spell, at least prior to the exhaustion of unemployment
benefits (Marinescu and Skandalis [2019], DellaVigna et al. [2020]). Adding to this evidence, our paper
highlights the under-reaction in beliefs to differences in job finding, both across workers and over the
unemployment spell, and shows the importance of the optimistic bias among the long-term unemployed
in particular. The biases in beliefs add to other behavioral frictions distorting job search, like present
bias (DellaVigna and Paserman [2005]), reference-dependence (DellaVigna et al. [2017]) and locus-of-
control (Caliendo et al. [2015], Spinnewijn [2015]), and indicate the potential for information policies
that aim at correcting these biases in particular.4
Third, our work relates to recent papers using survey elicitations to improve the estimation or cali-
bration of structural models of job search. For example, Hall and Mueller [2018] use elicited reservation
and offered wages in the New Jersey survey to identify different sources of wage dispersion in a search
model. Conlon et al. [2018] relate expectations to realized wage offers in the SCE and focus on the
updating of beliefs in response to wage offers to estimate a model of on- and off-the-job search with
learning frictions. Similar to our numerical analysis, they then use the estimated structural model to
assess the quantitative importance of these learning frictions. That job seekers’ beliefs have predictive
value has been documented elsewhere (Spinnewijn [2015], Arni et al. [2016]), but to our knowledge,
it has never been used to bound the heterogeneity in job finding and its contribution to the observed
decline in job finding. Elicited expectations are increasingly used in other applications, too, for example
to study job loss (e.g., Stephens [2004] and Hendren [2017]), educational and occupational choices (e.g.,
Delavande and Zafar [2014], Arcidiacono et al. [2014], Wiswall and Zafar [2015]) or household finance
(e.g., Fuster et al. [2018] and Crump et al. [2018]).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3 sets up a conceptual framework
and documents the basic facts in the data. Section 4 sets up the statistical model and estimates
heterogeneity and duration dependence in perceived and true job finding. Section 5 presents a behavioral
model of job search, including numerical results on the impact of biases in beliefs. Section 6 concludes.
3See also Honoré [1993] who proves identification with multiple unemployment spells in the context of the mixed
proportional hazard model. The comparative advantage of our approach is that it also captures heterogeneity that is
specific to a given unemployment spell (e.g., savings, family structure, etc.).
4See also the experimental evidence in Belot et al. [2020] who show how tailored information can change job seekers’
scope of search and Altmann et al. [2018] who show how information treatments can improve the re-employment outcomes.
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2 Data
As briefly discussed in the introduction, our empirical analysis builds on two distinct online surveys.
The first survey is the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE), which is run by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and surveys a representative sample of about 1,300 household heads across the US.
The sample is a rotating panel where each individual is surveyed every month for up to 12 months (see
Armantier et al., 2013, for details). Our sample period stretches from December 2012 to June 2019
during which 948 job seekers have been surveyed while unemployed. The second survey is the Survey
of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey, which was collected by Alan Krueger and Andreas Mueller and
surveyed around 6,000 unemployed job seekers (see the appendix of Krueger and Mueller [2011] for
details). In what follows, we refer to the survey as the Krueger-Mueller (KM) survey. The surveyed
job seekers were unemployment insurance recipients in October 2009 and interviewed every week for
12 weeks until January 2010. The long-term unemployed were surveyed for an additional twelve weeks
until April 2010.
Both surveys elicit the beliefs individuals hold when unemployed about their prospects to become
employed again. In the SCE, unemployed job seekers report the probability they expect to be employed
again both within the next 3 and 12 months. In the KM survey, job seekers report the probability
that they expect to be re-employed within the next 4 weeks, as well as how many weeks they expect it
will take before they are employed again. The beliefs are elicited up to 12 times (5 times) in the SCE
(KM survey) for job seekers who remain unemployed. The KM survey is a weekly survey, but the belief
questions were administered only every four weeks, starting about one month into the survey period.5
In addition to the elicited beliefs, both surveys contain information on the individuals’ employment
outcomes, and hence, we can link perceptions to actual outcomes for the same individuals. The SCE
is superior to the KM survey in this respect because it suffers less from attrition and skipping. As
reported by Armantier et al. [2017], out of those who completed one interview in the SCE, 74 percent
completed two interviews. Attrition is much lower after the second interview and, in fact, 58 percent
completed all 12 monthly interviews of the SCE panel. In addition, we find that nearly half of surveys
where the respondent was unemployed were followed by three consecutive monthly interviews, which is
the sub-sample that we use when comparing elicitations to employment outcomes over the next three
months. Even if there was no attrition, this number would be at most 75 percent, since unemployed
respondents who are rotating out of the panel survey do not have three monthly follow-up surveys
(this affects anyone in interviews 10, 11 and 12). In the KM survey, out of those 2,384 individuals
who completed the belief questions at least once, 60 percent completed the belief questions twice, but
only 21 percent completed them more than twice. To a large extent, this drop-off in participation in
the KM survey is simply due to the shorter horizon of the survey. However, we also find that the
elicited belief about the probability of finding a job was negatively related to the number of follow-up
surveys completed.6 While the invitations and reminder emails explicitly stated that respondents are
5The exact questions and response format is shown in Appendix A. See Appendix B for details on the sample size and
characteristics of each sub-sample used in the analysis.
6We find that the elicited probability is 26 percent for those with four weekly surveys within the next four weeks,
whereas it was 34 percent for those with less than four weekly survey within the next four weeks. We find no evidence of
attrition being related to the elicited beliefs in the SCE: The elicited 3-month job-finding probability was exactly the same
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE) and the
Krueger-Mueller (KM) Survey, and Comparions to the Current Population Survey (CPS)
SCE CPS KM Survey CPS NJ
(in %) 2012-19 2012-19 2009-10 2009-10
High-School Degree or Less 44.5 44.7 32.5 46.6
Some College Education 32.4 31.5 37.4 24.6
College Degree or More 23.1 23.8 30.1 28.8
Ages 20-34 25.4 35.3 38.1 39.4
Ages 35-49 33.5 33.0 35.4 33.4
Ages 50-65 41.1 31.7 26.5 27.2
Female 59.3 49.3 48.6 43.5
Black 19.1 23.6 24.4 21.4
Hispanic 12.5 18.4 27.5 22.1
Monthly job-finding rate
... Full sample 18.7 23.5 10.3 15.9
... Duration 0-6 months 25.8 29.0 13.5 21.7
... Duration 7+ months 12.7 13.5 9.2 10.1
# of respondents 948 — 2,384 —
# of respondents w/ at least 2 surveys 534 — 1,422 —
# of survey responses 2,597 103,309 4,803 2,818
Notes: All samples restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65. The SCE and KM samples are restricted
to interviews where the belief questions were administered. To be comparable to the SCE, the CPS sample
in column 2 is restricted to household heads. The CPS sample in column 4 is restricted to New Jersey.
Survey weights are used for all statistics shown in the table. The monthly job-finding rate in the SCE and
CPS is the U-to-E transition rate between two consecutive monthly interviews. The monthly job-finding
rate in the KM survey is calculated as the fraction of unemployed workers who accepted a job or started
working in the next four consecutive weekly interviews.
invited back to the survey regardless of their employment status, this suggests that the KM survey still
exhibited some differential attrition by expected employment outcomes, introducing a potential bias
when relating beliefs to employment outcomes later in the survey. For this reason, we focus mostly on
the SCE when comparing beliefs to employment outcomes.
Table 1 compares some basic survey outcomes and demographics for the unemployed workers in the
two surveys as well as the Current Population Survey (CPS). All samples are restricted to unemployed
workers, ages 20-65. The sample of unemployed in the SCE is relatively small, which is due to the fact
that – unlike the KM survey – the SCE samples the entire population and the sub-sample of unemployed
is only a small fraction of it. The unemployed in the SCE closely match the educational attainment of
the unemployed in the CPS, though there are some differences by gender and age. The KM survey’s
sample is representative of unemployment insurance recipients in New Jersey, see Krueger and Mueller
[2011] for details. The KM survey over-sampled long-term unemployed workers, but the survey includes
survey weights, which adjust for both oversampling and non-response. The differences in the sampling
universe also explain some of the differences in the characteristics of the unemployed between the SCE
(49 percent) for those who did and did not complete three monthly interviews within the next three months. Similarly,
Appendix Table B.1 shows that in the SCE the 1-month job-finding rate is not related to the number of interviews
completed, though there appears to be some differential attrition by education and age.
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and the KM survey. The monthly job-finding rate in the SCE is 18.7 percent compared to 10.3 percent
in the KM survey, where the lower rate in the latter is likely due to the lower job-finding rate in the
immediate aftermath of the Great Recession, but may also be driven by differential attrition. In both
datasets the job-finding rates exhibit substantial observed (negative) duration dependence. In the SCE
(KM) survey, monthly job-finding rates of long-term unemployed workers are about one half (two thirds)
of the job-finding rates of the short-term unemployed. The job-finding rate in the CPS is somewhat
higher compared to the SCE, but the observed percent decline in job finding between the short- and
long-term unemployed is similar across the two surveys.
3 Empirical Evidence
This section presents the elicitations of job seekers’ perceptions and how they relate to actual job finding.
Our central objects of interest are the true and perceived job-finding rate, which we denote by Ti,d and
Zi,d respectively, and how they differ across individuals i and unemployment durations d. We first
demonstrate conceptually how the relation between elicited beliefs and actual job finding can be used
to analyze heterogeneity and duration dependence in both perceived and true job-finding rates. The
conceptual framework guides the reduced-form empirical evidence that we present in this section. We
then add functional and distributional assumptions in the next section to estimate the full distribution
of true and perceived job-finding rates across job seekers and unemployment durations.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
An individual’s true job-finding probability Ti,d cannot be directly observed, nor is it possible to observe
differences in job finding across individuals or how individual job finding evolves over the unemployment
spell. We do, however, observe the realization Fi,d of the job search of an unemployed individual at
duration d, i.e., whether she finds a job (Fi,d = 1) or not (Fi,d = 0). We can also observe how the average
job-finding rate Ed(Ti,d) = Ed(Fi,d) among the unemployed job seekers changes over the unemployment
spell. This is typically found to be decreasing, as is the case in our data (see Table 1).
The observed duration dependence in job finding can be decomposed as follows:7




where the subindex denotes the duration at which the job seekers are sampled to evaluate the cor-
responding moment. This decomposition clearly demonstrates how any observed (negative) duration
dependence in job finding can be driven by true duration dependence in job finding, Ed(Ti,d−Ti,d+1) > 0,
or by the dynamic selection of job seekers with worse re-employment prospects into prolonged unem-
ployment, covd (Ti,d, Ti,d+1) > 0. The dynamic selection itself depends on how much heterogeneity there
is in individuals’ job finding and whether individuals’ job-finding probabilities are persistent,
covd (Ti,d, Ti,d+1) = vard (Ti,d)− covd (Ti,d, Ti,d − Ti,d+1) . (2)
7We provide the derivations underlying the equations in this section in Appendix C.
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When all heterogeneity in job-finding probabilities is permanent, the contribution of dynamic selection
to the observed decline in job finding is fully determined by the variance in job finding vard(Ti,d). In
the other extreme, where all heterogeneity in job-finding probabilities is transitory, dynamic selection
does not contribute to the observed decline in job finding.
The challenge is to separate the role of these forces empirically as individual job-finding rates cannot
be observed. Through surveys, however, we can elicit an individual’s perceived job-finding probability
Zi,d and how it evolves over the unemployment spell. Importantly, when ex-ante elicitations are predic-
tive of ex-post realizations, their relationship can be leveraged to learn about the ex-ante heterogeneity
in true job finding itself. The elicited beliefs can also be compared to job seekers’ average job finding
to learn about biases in beliefs and their evolution over the unemployment spell.
Lower Bound on Heterogeneity If individuals had perfect information about their employment
prospects, the heterogeneity in job finding chances would be fully captured by the variance in elicited
beliefs. Beliefs, however, may be subject to bias and elicited with error. Still, the predictive value
of individuals’ elicitations can help uncover the heterogeneity in true job-finding probabilities. For
binary risks the covariances of beliefs with ex-post job finding realizations and with ex-ante job-finding
probabilities simply coincide, covd (Zi,d, Fi,d) = covd (Zi,d, Ti,d). So, when elicited beliefs are an unbiased
- but potentially noisy - measure of job finding, the covariance between beliefs and ex-post job finding
exactly identifies the variance in ex-ante job-finding probabilities vard (Ti,d) (see Hendren [2013]).
More generally, even when beliefs are biased, we can bound this variance using the Cauchy-Schwarz






For a given variance in elicitations, a larger covariance between elicitations and realizations indicates
less noise in the elicited beliefs, and thus a larger variance in the job-finding probabilities. When the
elicited beliefs are subject to noise, we can further tighten this bound by using multiple elicitations in
job seekers’ beliefs, Zki,d (which are available in both surveys). Following a similar argument as Morrison
















This bound relies on the elicitations not being negatively correlated, conditional on job finding chances,
and their conditional expectation (and thus the bias) being the same.
The bounds in (3) and (4) use only beliefs to predict the variation in job-finding probabilities. More
generally, from the variance decomposition, we know that any predictable variance, vard (Ed (Ti,d|Xi,d)),
provides a non-parametric lower bound on the variance in true job-finding probabilities, vard (Ti,d).
While this holds for any set of observables, we find that job seekers’ beliefs are particularly predictive.
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Model of Beliefs While the non-parametric bounds are robust to biases in beliefs, we can go
beyond partial identification by specifying how beliefs relate to observable variation in job finding.
Consider the following model of beliefs where job seekers’ elicited beliefs are an affine transformation of
true job finding,
Zi,d = b0 + b1Ti,d + εi,d, (5)
with εi,d capturing random error in the elicited beliefs (E(εi,d|Ti,d) = 0). The intercept b0 captures a
bias in perceptions that is common to all individuals. The slope parameter b1 captures the extent to
which the variation in job-finding rates is perceived. The covariance between perceived and actual job
finding scales the variance in true job-finding rates with the slope parameter b1,
covd(Zi,d, Fi,d) = b1vard(Ti,d). (6)
If job seekers’ elicitations under-react to variation in job finding (b1 < 1), the covariance between
perceived and actual job finding underestimates the variance in true job finding, and vice versa.
Now we can leverage the variation in job-finding rates across durations to learn about the slope
parameter. Intuitively, this parameter is revealed by the compression of the differences in Z’s relative
to the distribution of T ’s across durations. For the linear model, this becomes
b1 =
Ed+1 (Zi,d+1)− Ed (Zi,d)
Ed+1 (Ti,d+1)− Ed (Ti,d)
. (7)
E.g., with b1 < 1, the low-Ti,d types are more optimistic and thus over-optimism is predominant among
those who fail to find a job and remain unemployed for longer.8
Note that our identification argument for vard(Ti,d) continues to hold in the presence of non-classical
measurement error with E(εi,d|Ti,d) linear in Ti,d. While it changes the interpretation of b1, capturing
both biases and non-classical measurement error, it does not change any of the equations above. The
covariance between elicitations and job finding in (6) still pins down the variance of job-finding proba-
bilities, subject to the attenuation factor b1, which is still identified by the compression of the differences
in Z’s relative to the differences in T ’s across durations in (7). We use the statistical model further
below to probe the sensitivity of our results to the type of measurement error, and find that our results
are generally robust.
Persistence in Job Finding The decomposition in equations (1) and (2) highlights that tran-
sitory heterogeneity in job finding does not contribute to dynamic selection. Only if differences in job
finding probabilities are persistent, does the lower bound on heterogeneity translate to an upper bound
on the role of true duration dependence. We can again use the relationship between actual job finding
and elicited beliefs, but now using the lagged rather than contemporaneous beliefs, to shed light on the
8In principle, we could use other observable variation in job-finding rates to estimate how perceived and true job finding
relate, for example between more and less educated job seekers. However, in that case we would need to assume that the
average bias remains constant across workers with different education (or any other observable used). Using time spent
unemployed to obtain variation in job-finding rates gives the advantage that we can actually observe how job seekers’
beliefs change over the spell, allowing us to relax the assumption that perceptions respond in the same way to variation in
job finding across and within job seekers. We show this in the statistical model in Section 4.
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persistence in job finding probabilities. For the linear beliefs model, we have
covd+1 (Zi,d, Fi,d+1) = b1covd+1 (Ti,d, Ti,d+1) , (8)
which relates to the dynamic selection term in equation (1). When the heterogeneity in job finding can
be represented by permanent differences and random transitory shocks, Ti,d = Ti + τi,d, their respective
role is fully captured by the difference in predictive value of lagged and contemporaneous beliefs.9
In what follows, we describe the elicited beliefs, how they relate to actual job finding, and how
they change over the spell of unemployment. We use this evidence to gauge the importance of the
different forces underlying the observed duration dependence in job finding, following the decomposition
arguments above. We then develop these arguments in full in the context of a statistical model in Section
4. It is important again to note that our identification of the distribution of actual job finding does not
rely on separating the role of biases vs. elicitation errors, nor does it depend on how job seekers’ search
strategy relates to the elicited beliefs. We do, however, take a stance on both issues when we study the
impact of beliefs on search in Section 5.
3.2 Elicited Beliefs about Job Finding
The two surveys ask unemployed job seekers to report their chances of finding a job that they will accept,
which we refer to as the job-finding probability (see Appendix A for the wording of the questions asked
in both surveys). Figure 1 shows the histograms of these perceived job-finding probabilities at the
three-month horizon in the SCE and the one-month horizon in the KM survey. For both surveys there
is substantial dispersion over the entire range of potential probabilities. The perceived probabilities over
the one-month horizon in the KM survey are more skewed to the left than the perceived probabilities
over the three-month horizon in the SCE and the former are relatively high compared to the latter.
While the elicitation horizon may be relevant, this comparison is difficult because it is across different
samples. A common issue when eliciting probabilities is that subjects may bunch at round numbers.
We do observe significant bunching for both measures, in particular at 50%, as apparent in Figure 1.10
To assess the validity of our elicitations and the robustness to bunching, we compare the elicited
beliefs about job finding at different horizons in the same sample of job seekers. In the SCE, job seekers
report the perceived job-finding probability at a three-month horizon as well as at a twelve-month
horizon. We compare the distribution of the twelve-month job-finding probabilities to the imputed
job-finding probability over twelve months based on the elicitation over a three-month horizon (see
Appendix Figure D3). We find a high correlation of 0.76 between the two measures at the individual
level. We also find that the distribution of the ratio of the two statistics has a mode of 1 (see Appendix
Figure D4). This suggests that many survey respondents submit responses that are fully consistent
9In Appendix C, we show indeed that, in this case,






10Manski [2004] discusses other surveys where respondents use the entire range of probabilities from 0 to 100, as well as
additional evidence that respondents are willing and able to provide meaningful probabilistic responses.
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Figure 1: Histograms of Elicited Job-Finding Probabilities
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Notes: Survey weights are used for histograms, and samples are restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65.
with each other, at least if they believe that they live in a stationary world where the unemployment
probability does not change over the spell of unemployment.
In the KM survey, job seekers report not only the perceived probability of finding employment,
but also how many weeks they expect it will take to be employed again. The inverse of the expected
unemployment duration equals the perceived job-finding rate averaged over the remaining unemploy-
ment spell. Hence, the elicited average job-finding rate and the job-finding rate for next month should
be related, again depending on whether an individual expects the job-finding rate to change over the
unemployment spell.11 Importantly, the alternative elicitation has the advantage that it avoids the
sharp bunching at 0, 50 and 100, but except for the difference in bunching, the distribution looks very
similar to the distribution of the perceived job-finding rates for the next month. The individual-level
correlation between the two measures equals 0.65 (see Appendix Figure D3).12 The similarity between
the different measures is also confirmed by Figure D4 in the Appendix, which plots the distribution
of the ratio of the two measures, indicating that for most people the two measures indeed coincide.
Overall, the similarity between the alternative elicitations is re-assuring. Our empirical analysis using
the KM survey will focus on the elicited probability, but we will show that our results are similar for
the expected duration measure and robust to the observed bunching at 0, 50 or 100.
3.3 Job Finding Beliefs and Outcomes
We now study how job seekers’ beliefs about job-finding probabilities compare to actual job finding
outcomes. We focus here on the SCE’s 3-month elicitation as it suffers less from attrition and gaps
in survey completion, but we replicate all results in this section for the KM survey in the Appendix.
11To be precise, given that the question was phrased in weeks, we impute the implied 1-month re-employment probability
as 1− (1− 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited remaining weeks unemployed.
12Note that throughout the paper we trim extreme outlier observations: In the KM survey, we eliminate 51 responses
where the elicited and imputed probability are more than 75 percentage points apart and thus clearly inconsistent with each
other. In the SCE, we eliminate 316 observations, where the 3-month probability is larger than the 12-month probability.
We report robustness checks in the Appendix for not imposing these restrictions. If we do not impose this restriction, the
correlation coefficient between the two measures remains high at 0.56 in the KM survey and 0.72 in the SCE.
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Notes: The figure shows a binned scatter plot with the average realized job-finding rates shown for
different bins of elicited job-finding probabilities. The job-finding rates are at the three-month horizon.
Survey weights are used for averages, and the sample is restricted to unemployed workers in the SCE,
ages 20-65, and includes only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly interviews.
In the SCE, we restrict the sample to those interviews where we have 3 monthly consecutive follow-up
interviews, to make sure that we do not miss any employment spells.
Predictive Power of Beliefs We can assess the predictive power of job seekers’ beliefs by relating
the elicited beliefs about job finding to actual job finding. Figure 2 shows the average job-finding
probability within the next three months by the perceived three-month job-finding probability in the
SCE. The positive gradient clearly reveals the strong predictive nature of the elicited beliefs - on
average, people who report a higher job-finding probability are more likely to find a job. Still, job
seekers reporting the lowest probabilities tend to be too pessimistic (on average), while job seekers
reporting higher probabilities tend to be too optimistic. The average job-finding probability ranges
from 18 percent to 72 percent for job seekers reporting probabilities in the first to the last decile.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the corresponding regression estimates, regressing a binary indicator for
whether a job seeker has found a job within the next three months on the elicited probability. The
results confirm the predictive nature of the elicited beliefs. On average, the job-finding probability
is 0.59 percentage points higher for an individual who reports his or her job-finding probability to
be 1 percentage point higher. The coefficient is only slightly lower when adding various controls,
including gender, age, income, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, in column 3 of the table. This
demonstrates that individuals’ beliefs contain relevant information about future employment prospects
above and beyond these demographic controls. The coefficient on the elicited job-finding probability
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Table 2: Regressions of Realized on Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probabilities (SCE)
Panel A. Contemporaneous Elicitations
Dependent Variable: Indicator
Variable for Realized Job Finding (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elicited Job-Finding Probability 0.586*** 0.464*** 0.501***
(0.073) (0.069) (0.092)
Elicited Job-Finding Probability -0.258*
x Long-Term Unemployed (0.142)
Long-Term Unemployed -0.078
(0.094)
Demographic Controls x x x
Observations 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201
R2 0.131 0.148 0.218 0.259
Panel B. Lagged Elicitations
Dependent Variable: Indicator
Variable for Realized Job Finding (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elicited Job-Finding Probability 0.346**
(0.136)
Lagged Elicited Job-Finding Probability 0.366*** 0.301***
(0.105) (0.101)
Demographic Controls x x
Observations 474 474 474 474
R2 0.063 0.123 0.063 0.159
Notes: The table shows the results of linear regressions of a variable that indicates whether the
individual found a job within the next 3 months on the elicited 3-month job-finding probability without
and with demographic controls. Panel A uses contemporaneous elicitations as regressors whereas Panel
B (columns 3 and 4) use elicitations from the interview 3 months before. Column 1 in Panel B
uses contemporaneous elicitations as a regressor but is restricted to the same sample that is used for
the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4. Controls include dummies for gender, race, ethnicity,
household income, educational attainment, and age and age squared. All coefficients are shown in
Appendix Table D1. Long-term unemployment is defined as a duration of unemployment of more than
6 months. Survey weights are used in all regressions. All samples are restricted to unemployed workers
in the SCE, ages 20-65, and include only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly
interviews. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual level) are in parentheses with statistical
significance indicated at the *0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 level.
is high, but still significantly smaller than 1. This attenuation could be driven by random errors in
perceptions or elicitations, which increase the variance in elicited beliefs, and/or by systematic biases
in beliefs reflected by the parameter b1 in the linear beliefs model.
In similar regressions carried out in the KM survey, we find a coefficient of 0.260 (s.e. 0.109) for
the 1-month probability question (see Table D3 in the Appendix). The smaller coefficient in the KM
survey compared to the SCE could be driven by the different horizon used for the elicitation. Indeed,
we find a larger coefficient (0.402; s.e. 0.178) when we run the same regression but with the inverse of
the expected duration as the independent variable. Similar to the SCE, the perception questions retain
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significant predictive value when adding controls, and the predictive power is higher for the short-term
unemployed with a coefficient of 0.382 for the 1-month probability and 0.513 for the inverse of the
expected duration, compared to a coefficient of 0.501 in the SCE, as reported in column 4 of Table 2.
Robustness We probe the robustness of our estimates by running different versions of the re-
gression reported in column 1 of Table 2. Appendix Table D2 shows that our results are robust (1) to
instrumenting the 3-month eliciation with the 12-month elicitation (coefficient of 0.71), (2) to excluding
answers equal to 50% (coefficient of 0.59), (3) to not trimming the sample for inconsistent answers
between the 3- and 12-month elicitation (coefficient of 0.55), (4) to including only one unemployment
spell for each person (coefficient of 0.62), (5) to including only the first observation for each person (co-
efficient of 0.44), (6) to including only those individuals who entered the SCE survey as employed and
separate into unemployment during the survey period (coefficient of 0.65), (7) to controlling for cohort
and time fixed effects (coefficient of 0.55), (8) to including only answers for those unemployed 3 months
or less (coefficient of 0.57). In line with column 4 in Table 2, we also find that the coefficient declines
with unemployment duration, with a value of 0.50 for those unemployed 4-6 months and a value of 0.35
for those unemployed 7 months or more, though the coefficient remains highly statistically significant in
all samples. Note also that we cannot reject the hypothesis of the equality of coefficients with the one
in the baseline specification for all sub-samples except for the long-term unemployed. Overall, we find
that our results are robust and confirm the substantial predictive power of reported beliefs for realized
job finding. We also report the same robustness checks for the regression with controls, as in column 3
of Table 2. Again, the results for all robustness checks are similar to the baseline results.
Lower Bound on Heterogeneity The explanatory power of the beliefs in the SCE is large
(R2 = 0.13) and almost the same as for all other observables together (R2 = 0.15).13 Moreover, the
results in column 2 and 3, where the R2 increases from 0.15 to 0.22 when adding the elicited beliefs
to the regression model with controls, confirm that the elicited beliefs have predictive power above
and beyond observable characteristics. To formally assess the amount of heterogeneity in job finding,
we calculate the non-parametric lower bounds on the variance in job-finding probabilities derived in





and equals 0.032. This lower bound can be tightened by including the







. This increases the
lower bound to 0.038.14 As discussed, we can also tighten the bound further by including observable
13Note that even if the perceived and actual job-finding probabilities were to coincide, we would not expect an R2 of 1 as
we are not using the actual job finding probability but a dummy variable for the realization of the probability. The inherent
randomness associated with the realization of the job-finding probability thus implies an R2 that is substantially lower
than 1 even if beliefs were unbiased and measured without error. In the case where job seekers had perfect information




N . Using these moments from the SCE data, we obtain a value of 0.36, suggesting that the R2 of 0.13 for the actual job
finding realizations is substantial and that the elicited job-finding probabilities have substantial predictive power.
14As discussed, the lower bound argument requires the conditional expectations of the respective elicitations to be equal
and the elicitations, conditional on job finding, not to be negatively correlated. Hence, we converted the elicited 12-
month probability (Z̃12i,d) into a 3-month probability (Z
12
i,d), assuming the latter is constant over the spell of unemployment:




Table 3: Lower Bounds for the Variance of 3-Month Job-Finding Probabilities (SCE)
Non-Parametric Lower Bound Based on Value S.e.
... the Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability 0.032 (0.009)
... the Elicited 3- and 12-Month Job-Finding Probabilities 0.038 (0.010)
... Controls 0.036 (0.009)
... Controls and the Elicited 3- and 12-Month Job-Finding Probabilities 0.054 (0.010)
Notes: The non-parametric lower bounds based on 3-month elicitations and 3- and 12-month elicitations are
computed according to equations (3) and (4), respectively. The lower bounds based on controls (and both
elicitations) are the variance of the predicted value of a linear regression of a dummy for realized job finding on
controls (and the elicited 3- and 12-month job-finding probability). The controls are the same as those used in
Table 2. Survey weights are used for all moments shown in the table. The sample is restricted to unemployed
workers in the SCE, ages 20-65, and includes only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly
interviews. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications.
characteristics. The variance of the predicted job finding, using both beliefs and demographics (see
column 3 in Table 2), equals 0.054. To interpret the magnitude of these variances, we compute how
much the implied dynamic selection could contribute to the observed negative duration dependence in
job finding (see equations (1) and (2)). The decline in the 3-month job-finding rate between months
0-3 and months 4-6 equals 17.0 percentage points. A variance in 3-month job finding of 0.032 could
account for a decline in the job-finding rate of 8.9 percentage points through selection, which is 52% of
the observed decline of 17.0 percentage points. The higher variance of 0.054 could explain a decline of
15.1 percentage points through selection or 89% of the total observed decline.15
A first caveat with these calculations is that we use the full sample to compute the lower bounds
in Table 3, while it is the variance in job finding conditional on unemployment duration that is rel-
evant for determining the contribution of selection to the observed negative duration dependence in
job finding. We fully address this in our statistical model in the next section that parametrizes the
relevant heterogeneity and dynamics and uses the reduced-form empirical moments for estimation by
simulating exact equivalents in the model. Our reduced-form evidence already indicates that beliefs
become somewhat less predictive when controlling for unemployment duration, though they remain
highly predictive for the short-term unemployed (see columns 4 in Table 2 for the SCE). Indeed, in the
SCE, when residualizing the beliefs, taking out the variation across durations, the lower bound variance
becomes smaller (0.03), but could still account for half of the decline in the observed job-finding rate at
the beginning of the unemployment spell. When restricting instead to the short-term unemployed (see
Appendix Table D4), the lower bound variance becomes larger again (0.06) and could in fact account
for all of the decline, leaving no role for true duration dependence.
A second caveat is that some of the heterogeneity in job finding identified by our approach may
be transitory and thus does not contribute to selection over the unemployment spell. To assess this
further, we use the elicited beliefs in the SCE to infer the persistence in individual job-finding rates,
by restricting the sample to those who remained unemployed for at least 4 months and relating actual
15Appendix Table D5 reports the non-parametric bounds in the KM survey, which are substantially lower than in the
SCE, but refer to the 1-month probability rather than to the 3-month probability. The lower bound on the variance
based on the 1-month elicitation in the KM survey can account for an observed decline in the monthly job-finding rate of
0.45 percentage points per month, or 3.3 percent per month, when expressed as a percent of the job-finding rate for the
short-term unemployed. Computed over a period of 3 months, this is about two thirds of the relative decline estimated
based on the 3-month elicitation in the SCE.
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job finding to beliefs lagged by 3 months. The results in Panel B of Table 2 show that in this sample
the coefficients on the reported beliefs are generally smaller, but the reported beliefs retain a strong
predictive power beyond the horizon of the 3-month question administered in the SCE. We find that
for this sample of job seekers the relative difference in the covariance between the job finding and the
contemporaneous and lagged beliefs, is only 11%. This suggests that most of the variation in job seekers’
job finding prospects, captured by the 3-month horizon question, is driven by persistent differences.16
Again, the statistical model in the next section is used to properly account for this issue.
Overall, our reduced-form results suggest that heterogeneity in job finding is important for explaining
the observed duration dependence in job finding.
3.4 Biases in Beliefs
We now document how beliefs and actual job finding differ along the unemployment spell. In contrast
with job seekers’ true job finding, we can also study the within-individual change in their beliefs over the
unemployment spell. As discussed above, it is possible to identify a lower bound on the heterogeneity
in job finding from elicitations in beliefs without reference to potential biases in beliefs. However, if one
wants to go beyond the lower bound and identify the level of the variance in job finding, one needs to
specify a model of beliefs and identify the nature of these biases in the first place.
Average Bias by Duration While we cannot compare the actual and perceived job-finding
probabilities at the individual level, we can compare averages at the group level. Overall, the results
indicate an average optimistic bias that is largely driven by the long-term unemployed. At the three-
month horizon in the SCE, we find an average optimistic bias (8 p.p.) indicating that job seekers
perceive their chances to be 20 percent higher than they are. Figure 3 compares the averages in the
SCE by unemployment duration. The figure confirms that the observed duration dependence in actual
job-finding rates is strongly negative. The perceived job-finding rates are also decreasing, but at a slower
rate. As a result, the bias is increasing with unemployment duration, resulting in a clear bias towards
over-optimism for the long-term unemployed. The overall bias is substantially larger in the KM survey,
but we find similar results by duration of unemployment, see Appendix Table D6.
The patterns of perceived and realized job finding can inform the model of beliefs in Section 3.1.
Based on equation (7), we compute an estimate of b1 for two different duration intervals in the SCE.
We find estimates of b1 of 0.512 (0-3 vs. 4-6 months) and 0.556 (4-6 vs. 7+ months), suggesting that
jobseekers’ perceptions under-respond to their true job-finding probability. Using an average of 0.534 of
the two estimates and an estimate of 0.054 of the covariance between the 3-month eliciation and realized
job finding, cov(Z3i,d, F
3
i,d), we can leverage equation (6), to obtain an estimate for the variance in job-
finding probabilities of var(Ti,d) = 0.101. Benchmarking this as before, such variance would account
for a decline of 28 percentage points over the first three months of the unemployment spell through
16Combining equations (6) and (9), one can solve for var(τ) as a function of b1 and data moments. Using our estimate
of b1 = 0.534 from further below and the values for the moments covd+1 (Zi,d+1, Fi,d+1) = 0.0308, covd+1 (Zi,d, Fi,d+1) =
0.0289 and Ed(Ti,d) = 0.491, we get an estimate of var(τ) = 0.0045, which corresponds to 8% of the total variance. The
covariance moments are computed in the sample used for the regressions in Panel B of Table 2. Note that this derivation is
done for a stylized model that ignores true duration dependence in job finding. Moreover, we compute again all moments
over all durations, whereas the equations are exact only for a given duration d.
17
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Notes: The series in the figure show the averages of the elicited 3-month job-finding probability
and realized 3-month job-finding rate respectively for different intervals of unemployment duration.
The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Survey weights are used for the averages shown in
the figure. The sample is restricted to unemployed workers in the SCE, ages 20-65, and includes
only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly interviews.
selection, which more than fully accounts for the observed decline. However, the relevant moments in
the decomposition equation (1) condition on duration and account for the persistence in job finding,
which reduces the contribution of dynamic selection to the decline in job finding.17
Job Finding Beliefs by Duration The panel dimension of the surveys provides a unique oppor-
tunity to assess the duration dependence in perceived job finding. Table 4 shows the results of linear
regressions of the elicited beliefs on duration of unemployment, measured in months. The first column
shows the results for the sample restricted to the first observation for each unemployment spell, and
the second and third columns show the results for the pooled cross-section of all observations available
during an unemployment spell. The results of all three columns confirm the negative effect of unem-
ployment duration on the elicited beliefs in the cross-section. However, it is again unclear whether these
patterns are due to selection – those with high perceived probabilities find jobs faster and leave the
sample – or due to changes in the beliefs at the individual level.
To adjust for selection, we exploit the repeated survey questions answered by the same job seekers
over the unemployment spell. Column 4 in Table 4 includes in the regression spell or person fixed
effects. Note that in the SCE, some individuals have multiple unemployment spells and thus we control
for each spell separately, whereas in the KM survey we only observe one spell per person.18 In the SCE,
the estimated effect of duration turns from negative to positive when including spell fixed effects with
the job-finding probability at the 3-month horizon increasing by 0.2 (0.6) percentage points per month,
17Using the residualized covariance, which takes out all variation across durations, we obtain an estimate for the variance
of 0.067 (see Appendix Table D4). The implied decline in job finding is just above the observed decline (18.6 p.p.).
18Consistent with Elsby et al. [2015], we treat transitions from unemployment to out of the labor force and back to
unemployment as part of the same unemployment spell.
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Table 4: Linear Regressions of Elicited Job-Finding Probabilities on Duration of Unemployment
Panel A. SCE
Depdendent Variable: Elicited
3-Month Job-Finding Probability (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Duration, in Months -0.0057*** -0.0050*** -0.0043*** 0.0022
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0064)
Demographic Controls x
Spell Fixed Effects x
Observations 882 2,281 2,281 2,281
R2 0.110 0.090 0.155 0.824
Panel B. KM Survey
Dependent Variable: Elicited
1-Month Job-Finding Probability (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Duration, in Months -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0025* 0.0216***
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0077)
Demographic Controls x
Individual Fixed Effects x
Observations 2,278 4,435 4,318 4,435
R2 0.001 0.002 0.119 0.902
Notes: The table shows the results for linear regressions of elicited job-finding probabilities on duration of
unemployment. Column 1 shows the results for a sample that is for each individual restricted to the first observation
in the survey; column 2 shows the results for the full sample; column 3 shows the results for the full sample with
the same demographic controls as in Table 2; and column 4 shows the results for the full sample with spell or
individual fixed effects. Survey weights are used in all regressions. All samples are restricted to unemployed
workers, ages 20-65. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the individual level except for
column 4 in Panel A, where they are clustered at the spell level. Statistical significance is indicated at the *0.1,
**0.05 and ***0.01 level.
though the coefficient is not statistically significantly different from zero. Panel B in Table 4 shows
that this pattern is much stronger for the KM survey, where an additional month spent unemployed
significantly increases the perceived job-finding probability by 2.2 (0.8) percentage points per month.
Figure 4 illustrates the difference between the observed (cross-sectional) duration dependence and
the true (individual-level) duration dependence in the reported beliefs graphically. To increase power
and control for potential cohort effects, the figure aggregates by time unemployed in survey rather than
showing results by duration of unemployment. The left panel shows how the average of the perceived
job-finding probability is decreasing in time spent unemployed since the first interview observed in a
given spell, conditional on still being unemployed. The right panel in Figure 4 shows the change in the
perceived job-finding probability within individual unemployment spells, again as a function of time
spent unemployed since the first interview. The figures confirm the findings from the regression. In
the cross-section, the perceived job-finding probability is decreasing in time spent unemployed, but this
decline disappears once we control for selection and look at the within-spell changes only.19 In the KM
survey, job seekers even report higher job-finding rates as they remain unemployed for longer.
19In principle, the patterns of the within-spell changes could be driven by dynamic selection, since the observations later
in the spell require the job seeker to be unemployed for longer. The relationship in column 4 of Table 4, however, remains
positive in both surveys even when we restrict the sample to those with relatively short spells of 6 months or less.
19
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Notes: The figures show the elicited job-finding probabilities by months since the first interview, in which a belief
question was administered, for the SCE (Panel A) and the KM survey (Panel B). The left-hand side figures show
the raw averages of the elicited job-finding probabilities, whereas the right-hand side figures remove individual fixed
effects from the elicited job-finding probabilities. The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. Survey weights are
used for the averages shown in the figures, and the samples are restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65.
Robustness We extensively probe the robustness of the finding that beliefs are not revised down-
ward and also evaluate potential forces that may underlie the (weakly) increasing beliefs about job-
finding probabilities. We report here only a brief summary and refer to the Appendix D.3 for details.
First, we find that the results in column 4 of Table 4 are similar for other measures of perceived job
finding, such as expected remaining duration in the KM survey and the 12-month probability in the
SCE survey. The results are also robust to excluding answers of 50 or 100 percent, or to excluding
individuals who find a job within the next month. Moreover, we find that our results are robust to
controlling for changes in aggregate labor market conditions or aggregate time fixed effects during our
sample period. Finally, we find that our estimates are unlikely to be biased due to sample selection
based on individuals dropping out of the labor force: In the SCE, those unemployment spells with a
transition into out of the labor force do not exhibit any significant decline of beliefs over the spell of
unemployment. Moreover, in the KM survey, the belief questions were administered independent of
search effort and thus including those dropping out of the labor force. We conclude that our finding
that beliefs are not revised downward is very robust.
20
Discussion Our analysis of job seekers’ beliefs corroborates earlier evidence that job seekers’ are
too optimistic about their re-employment prospects (Spinnewijn [2015], Arni [2017], Conlon et al. [2018],
Drahs et al. [2018]). Importantly, we find that the over-optimistic bias is particularly strong among
long-term unemployed workers, implying that beliefs are under-responsive to differences in job finding,
across job seekers and/or along the unemployment spell. As discussed, this under-reaction is important
for inferring the heterogeneity and duration dependence in true job finding using job seekers’ beliefs.
We develop this insight further in Section 4. The under-reaction in beliefs is also important if it entails
that job seekers do not adjust their search strategy to the specific employment prospects they face. We
will study this issue further in Section 5.20
The empirical finding that job seekers, if anything, update their perceived job-finding probability
upward over the unemployment spell is surprising. However, our reduced-form evidence already suggests
that there is limited scope for negative true duration dependence in the actual job-finding probabilities.
This suggests that various mechanisms underlying true duration dependence like human capital depre-
ciation (see Acemoglu [1995] and Ljungqvist and Sargent [1998]), stock-flow sampling (see Coles and
Smith [1998]) and employer-screening based on unemployment duration (see Lockwood [1991]) are em-
pirically not important or, at least, not perceived as such. However, even with substantial variation in
employment prospects across job seekers (rather than over the spell), we would expect that job seekers
learn from the lack of success and update their beliefs downwards the longer they are unemployed. The
lack of updating that we find thus remains surprising, but seems consistent with Krueger and Mueller
[2016], who show – using data from the KM survey – that reservation wages are nearly constant over the
spell, and also with Marinescu and Skandalis [2019] and DellaVigna et al. [2020], who find that search
activity is constant or even increasing, at least prior to the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. These
findings, however, are not sufficient to infer a lack of updating in beliefs about job finding, as other
inputs into the probability of job finding such as the offer probability or the wage offer distribution may
change over the unemployment spell, too.21
While we do not attempt to micro-found these biases, it is worth noting that a number of behavioral
models can explain the observed optimistic biases in beliefs, why biases become more important or why
there may be lack of learning over the spell. For example, regarding the dynamics, job seekers may be
subject to the gambler’s fallacy. This is an application of the law of small numbers with unsuccessful job
seekers inferring from a series of bad draws (as their unemployment spell lasts) that the probability of a
good draw increases (Rabin and Vayanos [2010]). Job seekers may also have motivated beliefs, managing
their expectations to maintain a positive self-image or to get positive value from optimistic expectation,
potentially accounting for the implied distortions in their search behavior (e.g., Brunnermeier and Parker
[2005] and Koszegi [2006]). The argument would be that lasting unemployment causes hardship and
increases the demand for optimistic expectations. We cannot provide direct tests of either theory, but
20Providing direct evidence that biases in beliefs distort behavior is challenging. In Section 5, we study this through the
lens of a model that we calibrate to match true and perceived job finding in our data. In Appendix D.3.3, we discuss some
further evidence on how perceptions correlate with reported search efforts and reservations wages.
21Krueger and Mueller [2011] document a decline in search activity over the unemployment spell at the individual level,
but these patterns are subject to see-saw patterns across survey cohorts, raising concerns about survey response bias in
search effort. Appendix Figure D7 shows that there is no evidence of see-saw patterns or systematic cohort effects in the
beliefs elicited in the KM survey.
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the findings that the perceptions of long-term unemployed are more biased and less predictive can be
consistent with these behavioral models. In a similar spirit, we provide further evidence in Appendix
D.3.3 that the perceptions of unemployed individuals are not responsive to macro-economic indicators.
4 Statistical Framework
This section describes a statistical model that allows us to use the reduced-form moments from our
empirical analysis to jointly identify (1) the extent of heterogeneity in job-finding rates, (2) the dynamics
of job-finding rates over the spell of unemployment and (3) the biases in perceived job-finding rates as
well as their evolution over the spell of unemployment. The model draws heavily on the conceptual
framework developed in Section 3.1, but fully specifies the heterogeneity across job seekers and the
dynamics over the unemployment spell, which allows to infer the parameters of interest with exact
equivalents of the moments in the data.
4.1 Model Setup
We introduce notation T xi,d to denote the probability of finding a job in the next x months for individual





Ti,d+(1−Ti,d)Ti,d+1 +(1−Ti,d)(1−Ti,d+1)Ti,d+2 is the probability of finding a job in the next 3 months.
Zxi,d is the elicitation of the corresponding perceived probability. F
x
i,d describes the actual job finding.
We assume that the monthly job-finding rate of individual i at duration d satisfies
Ti,d = (1− θ)d(Ti + τi,d) ∈ [0, 1], (10)
where θ is a scalar that determines the true depreciation in job finding over the spell of unemployment
(or appreciation when negative), Ti is the persistent component of the job-finding rate that is common
across durations and τi,d is a transitory change in job-finding rate at duration d with E(τi,d|Ti,d) = 0.
Ti and τi,d are distributed according to some distributions gT and gτ respectively.
We continue to impose the same linear structure on the relationship between job-finding rates and
elicited beliefs at the 3-month horizon:
Z3i,d = b0 + b1T
3
i,d + εi,d ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
As stated before, we cannot separate the role of biases in perceptions vs. noise in elicitations underlying
the model parameters and error terms. The variable εi,d captures random error in the elicited percep-
tions, which can be driven by either noise in the beliefs themselves or by noise in the elicitation of the
beliefs. In our baseline model, we assume that the conditional mean of the error term is independent of
T 3i,d, E(εi,d|T 3i,d) = 0, but non-classical measurement could still be captured through the slope param-
eter b1. While this separation is not needed to identify the heterogeneity in job finding, we do gauge




A key advantage of the statistical model is that the parameters of interest are estimated using exact
equivalents of the moments in data. To be more precise, in the conceptual framework, we derived
relationships between data moments and parameters for a given duration d, but due to limited sample
size, it is not possible to compute these moments in our data for each month of the unemployment spell.
Instead, the data moments are computed over intervals of duration (or the entire unemployment spell)
and thus subject to selection and true duration dependence within these intervals. The statistical model
develops an account of the data that fully addresses these issues in an internally consistent manner.
For the identification of the parameters in the statistical model, we build on the identification
arguments presented in Section 4 and develop them formally in a stylized two-period version in Appendix
Section E.4. To further validate the identification arguments in the full model, we show how the
estimated parameters change with the values of the targeted moments and how the model’s fit changes
when restricting the key features of the model, in particular regarding the heterogeneity and duration
dependence of both true and perceived job-finding probabilities. We also show extensively how the
model estimates are robust to different functional forms, distributional assumptions and incidental
parameters.
As discussed in Section 3, we face two interdependent identification challenges. The first is to disen-
tangle the heterogeneity and true duration dependence in job-finding rates that underlie the observed
duration dependence. The second is to identify how beliefs change with variation in job-finding rates.
Given our assumptions on the geometric depreciation and the permanent vs. transitory shocks, we can









where the subindex d again denotes the duration at which the job seekers are sampled to evaluate the
corresponding moment. The evolution of the observed job finding depends on the true depreciation in
job finding and the variance in the persistent component only.
In the absence of transitory shocks and biases in beliefs, we could simply identify the relevant vari-
ance in job finding through the covariance between perceived and actual job finding, and equation (12)
would give the true depreciation in job finding. In the presence of transitory shocks, the covariance
between perceived and actual job finding is no longer sufficient. As discussed before in Section 3.1,
transitory shocks generate more contemporaneous covariance of elicitations and job-finding rates, but
do not generate more covariance between elicitations and the job finding one period ahead. Hence, we
can separately identify the variance in transitory shocks through the difference in covariances, since the
contemporaneous covariance depends on both persistent and temporary components of Ti,d, whereas
the one period ahead covariance only depends on the persistent component. We develop this identifi-
cation argument formally in Appendix Section E.4 and show that the one-period ahead covariance is a
monotone function of the dispersion in transitory shocks.22
22In particular, Appendix Section E.4 starts with a formal proof of identification, showing that in a two-period version of
the statistical model, where στ = 0, all other parameters are an explicit function of moments with an empirical counterpart
in the data. We then develop the identification arguments in a two-period model with στ > 0. While we cannot solve
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Finally, the presence of systematic biases in beliefs also changes the covariance between perceived
and actual job finding relative to the variance in true job finding. If job seekers under-react to variation
in job finding (b1 < 1), the covariance between perceived and actual job finding underestimates the
variance in true job finding. As already discussed in Section 3.1, we identify this potential compression
by leveraging the variation in job-finding rates across durations.
By jointly exploiting the elicited beliefs and the structure imposed on the relationship between
elicited beliefs and job finding embedded in a dynamic framework, the statistical model goes beyond
earlier work identifying the role of heterogeneity through the dynamic selection on observables only.
Other prior work has tried instead to use indirect evidence on true duration dependence in job finding
(e.g., Kroft et al. [2013]) or to infer heterogeneity in multiple-spell data. Compared to the approach that
uses data on multiple unemployment spells as a source of identification (see, e.g., Honoré [1993] and
Alvarez et al. [2016]), our approach is made possible by the availability of elicitations and realizations
for the same individual in the same unemployment spell and thus does not rely on multiple spells for
the same individual.23 As mentioned before, our identification strategy abstracts from search decisions
underlying the job-finding rates and how they are affected by job seekers’ beliefs, which we study in
Section 5.
4.3 Distributional and Functional Form Assumptions
We parametrize our model parsimoniously. Baseline job-finding rates, Ti, follow the Beta distribution
with shape parameters α and β. The Beta distribution is defined over the interval [0, 1] and is quite
flexible in terms of its shape. The transitory component of the job-finding rate, τi,d, follows a uniform
distribution subject to the bounds [−Ti, 1(1−θ)d−Ti], and with masspoint(s) at the bounds of this interval
such that E(τi,d|Ti) = 0 for all Ti. Random error in perceptions or elicitations, εi,d, follows a uniform
distribution on the interval [−σε, σε] subject to the bounds [−b0 − b1T̂ 3i,d, 1 − b0 − b1T 3i,d], and with
masspoint(s) at the bounds of this interval such that E(εi,d|T 3i,d) = 0 for all T 3i,d. As discussed before,
the identification of heterogeneity does not rely on particular distribution functions for Ti, τi,d and εi,d,
and we test the sensitivity of our results to alternative distributional assumptions. Finally, job-finding
rates depreciate at a geometric rate over the unemployment spell in our baseline specification, with
θd = (1−θ)d. We provide more details on the baseline model and alternative specifications in Appendix
E.1.
4.4 Targeted Moments and Estimated Parameters
In our data, we observe the means of realized and perceived job-finding rates at different durations,
as well as their covariance and the variance in perceived job-finding rates. As already noted above,
explicitly the model for these parameters, we complement the argument by showing that a monotone relationship exists
between στ and the one period ahead covariance. We then also prove the identification of an extra longitudinal belief
parameter θ̂ 6= θ discussed in Section 4.5.
23Relying on multiple unemployment spells may skew the estimation results since a sample of individuals with multiple
(frequent) spells may not be entirely representative of the population. In addition, identification through multiple un-
employment spells only identifies the extent of heterogeneity that is fixed between unemployment spells, which may be
years apart, whereas our approach also identifies the heterogeneity that is fixed within a spell but varies across spells (e.g.,
changes in marital status, savings or unemployment insurance eligibility may affect the job-finding probability).
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we focus on the moments from the SCE data, because due to attrition we have less confidence in the
moments in the KM data that relate to the co-variance of perceptions and actual job finding. In the
estimation of our model, we target the following moments in the SCE data:
1. The mean of the 3-month job-finding rate at durations 0-3 months, 4-6 months and 7+ months:
mF03 = 0.642, mF46 = 0.472 and mF7+ = 0.256.
2. The mean of elicitations of the percent chance of finding a job in the next 3 months at durations
0-3 months, 4-6 months and 7+ months: mZ03 = 0.616, mZ46 = 0.529 and mZ7+ = 0.409.
3. The variance of elicitations of the percent chance of finding a job in the next 3 months: s2Z = 0.093.
4. The covariance of the 3-month job-finding rate and elicitations: cF,Z = 0.054.
5. The covariance of the 3-month job-finding rate (3-month ahead) and elicitations: cF+3,Z = 0.025.
6. The monthly change in 3-month elicitations as measured by the coefficient on duration in the
regressions of perceived job-finding rates on unemployment duration, controlling for individual
fixed effects: mdZ = 0.008.
This implies that we have a total of 10 moments that we try to match. With two parameter
distributions, there are 7 parameters to estimate (α, β, στ , θ, b0, b1, σε) and thus the model is over-
identified. Following our earlier discussion, the parameters α and β and θ are mainly identified through
the mean of job-finding rates at durations 0-3, 4-6 and 7 and higher, and the covariance of elicitations
and job-finding rates, whereas the parameter στ is mainly identified through the differences in the
covariances cZd,Fd and cZd,Fd+3 . The parameters b0 and b1 are mainly identified through the mean of
the deviations of elicitations from actual job-finding rates at durations 0-3, 4-6 and 7 and higher. While
b0 is mainly identified by the average bias between elicitations and job finding, b1 is identified by the
gradient of this bias by duration.24 The parameter σε is identified through the variance of elicitations.
4.5 Estimation and Results
We use the method of simulated moments to estimate the model parameters and minimize the sum of
squares of the deviation of the empirical moments from the moments simulated from the model. We use
the inverse of the bootstrapped covariance matrix of the empirical moments as weighting matrix, where
the bootstrapped variances were computed with 2,000 repetitions. Standard errors were obtained by
estimating the model on 200 bootstrap samples and taking the standard deviation of estimates across the
200 samples. As shown in the Appendix Table E1, our model matches the 10 moments very well, even
though it is over-identified. There is almost no discernible difference for the monthly innovations and the
variance and co-variance moments, which all carry a large weight in the estimation. The weighted sum
of squared residuals is 0.47. Table 5 shows the parameter estimates and selected moments of interest.
The estimation delivers two important sets of results, which confirm the reduced-form findings.
24Note that the gradient of the perceived job finding depends on the covariance of elicitations and job-finding rates,
determining the dynamic selection, and on the mean of monthly innovations in elicitations, determining the true duration
dependence in beliefs. As shown in Appendix Section E.4, in a stylized two-period model, the mean of monthly innovations
provides no additional identifying variation.
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Table 5: Estimation Results for Statistical Model
Panel A. Parameter Estimates
Parameter/Moment Explanation Estimate (S.e.)
E(Ti) Mean of distribution of permanent component, Ti 0.403 (0.057)
V ar(Ti) Variance of distribution of permanent component, Ti 0.045 (0.022)
στ Dispersion in transitory component of job finding, τi,d 0.334 (0.213)
θ True depreciation in job finding 0.017 (0.047)
b0 Intercept bias 0.265 (0.045)
b1 Slope bias 0.550 (0.101)
σε Dispersion in elicitation errors, εi,d 0.453 (0.020)
Panel B. Additional Moments
Moment Explanation Estimate (S.e.)
V ar0(T
3
i,0) Variance of true 3-month job-finding prob. at d = 0 0.076 (0.014)
V ar0(T
3
i ) Variance of permanent component of T
3
i,0 at d = 0 0.057 (0.023)
V ar0(Z
3
i,0) Variance of elicited 3-month job-finding prob. at d = 0 0.081 (0.005)
TD 12-month decline in true job-finding prob. (total) 0.459 (0.061)
LD 12-month decline in true job-finding prob. (longitudinal) 0.070 (0.171)
1− LDTD Share explained by selection (in %) 84.71 (36.37)
Notes: The table shows the estimation results of the statistical model, where Panel A provides the parameter estimates for
the baseline model and Panel B reports selected moments capturing the heterogeneity in true and perceived job finding and
the decline in true job finding over the first 12 months of the unemployment spell. For the distribution of the permanent
component, Ti, we show the implied mean and variance of the Beta distribution. The total decline (TD) is the difference
in the average of the true 3-month job-finding probability between job seekers at beginning of the unemployment spell
and those still unemployed after 12 months, E0(T
3
i,0) − E12(T 3i,12). The longitudinal decline (LD) is the individual-level
decline in the true 3-month job-finding probability over the first 12 months of the unemployment spell, averaged across
all job seekers, E0(T
3
i,0 − T 3i,12). 1− LDTD is the share of the total decline that the model attributes to heterogeneity in true
job-finding probabilities and the resulting process of dynamic selection.
Heterogeneity vs. True Duration Dependence The estimation reveals substantial hetero-
geneity in the job-finding rates and confirms that the observed negative duration dependence in job-
finding rates is predominantly driven by dynamic selection. Panel a of Figure 5 shows that the model
estimates imply a large dispersion of persistent types, Ti, at the start of the unemployment spells. The
estimated Beta distribution is unimodal and slightly skewed to the left. As the high-Ti types find jobs,
the distribution of the persistent component Ti among survivors becomes more skewed to the left with
a substantially lower average overall. These changes are more extreme one year into the unemployment
spell. Panel b of Figure 5 shows that the large amount of heterogeneity in job-finding rates accounts
for most of the observed duration dependence in job-finding rates. The figure compares simulations of
the baseline model (solid line) with simulations where the only source of duration dependence in job-
finding rates is θ 6= 0 (dashed line). Our model attributes 84.7% (s.e. 36.4%) of the decline in 3-month
job-finding rates, which is from 0.70 to 0.24 over the first year of unemployment, to selection.25 The
remainder – a decline of only 7 percentage points – is due to the true depreciation of the job-finding
25We note that this relative role is relatively imprecisely estimated, but this is not too surprising, given its residual
nature and thus dependence on all other parameters in the estimation. Nevertheless, we strongly reject the case that
attributes all of the observed duration dependence to depreciation at the individual level.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneity and Duration Dependence in the Estimated Model
a. Heterogeneity in Job Finding by Duration


















b. True vs. Observed Duration Dependence
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Observed Duration Dependence in Job Finding
True Duration Dependence in Job Finding
Notes: The figure shows further estimation results of the baseline model, where the figure in a. shows the distribution of
the permanent component of the true job-finding probability, Ti, at different durations of unemployment and the figure
in b. shows the observed and true duration dependence in realized 3-month job-finding rates. The observed duration
dependence in job finding shows the averages of the realized 3-month job-finding rate at duration d, averaged across job
seekers still unemployed after d months of unemployment, Ed(T
3
i,d). The true duration dependence in job finding shows
the realized 3-month job-finding rate at duration d, averaged across all job seekers, E0(T
3
i,d).
probability over the spell of unemployment. This corresponds to a modest monthly depreciation rate
of 1.7 percent for the 1-month job-finding rate.
To assess the amount of heterogeneity predicted by our model, we can compare it to our reduced-
form estimates in Section 3. The variance of 3-month job-finding probabilities in our model for all
durations is 0.102, which exactly coincides with our earlier calculation using reduced-form estimates for
cov(Z3i,d, F
3
i,d)/b1. The importance of adding structure on the beliefs can be gauged by comparing this
value to our non-parametric lower bound estimates in Section 3.3. We found that the non-parametric
lower bound on the variance in job finding using the 3-month elicitation alone was 0.032. This corre-
sponds to 31 percent of the estimated variance in 3-month job-finding probabilities in our model. We
tightened this bound further by including both the 3-month and the 12-month elicitation as well as the
observables used before to obtain a variance of predicted values of 0.054, which now corresponds to 53
percent of the estimated variance. The total variance of 3-month job-finding probabilities in our model
is somewhat larger than the variance of 0.076 that is reported in Table 5, where we restrict the sample
to newly unemployed workers. Finally, a significant share of this variation (25%) is driven by transitory
shocks, which do not contribute to dynamic selection. Overall, the differences in job finding are thus
estimated to be highly persistent, but somewhat less than suggested by the reduced-form evidence.
Biases in Beliefs The estimation also confirms the importance of biases in beliefs. Perceptions
substantially under-react to the variation in job finding across workers. On average, workers who face a
10 percent higher job-finding probability perceive their chances as only 5.50 percent higher (s.e. 1.01).
The slope bias is thus large and significant. Since the average wedge between actual and perceived
job finding is small, low-Ti types are estimated to be over-optimistic and conversely high-Ti types are
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over-pessimistic. Our baseline model does not allow for the variation in job-finding rates to be perceived
differently across and within job seekers. This implies that job seekers perceive only about half of the
7 percentage point decline of job finding over the first 12 months of their spell.
We probe the robustness of our results to the latter assumption, and extend our model to allow for
beliefs to be perceived differently across and within job seekers. Specifically, we assume a linear model
for the elicitations of the perceived 3-month job-finding rate:
Z3i,d = b0 + b1T̂
3
i,d + εi,d ∈ [0, 1], (13)
where we define the variable T̂i,d, in analogy to equation (10) above,
T̂i,d = (1− θ̂)d(Ti + τi,d) ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
The variable T̂ 3i,d (= T̂i,d+(1− T̂i,d)T̂i,d+1 +(1− T̂i,d)(1− T̂i,d+1)T̂i,d+2) captures the duration dependence
in perceptions through the parameter θ̂. This dynamic parameter depends on the perceived depreciation,
but also any learning from unsuccessful job search and is expressed at the monthly frequency so that
it directly corresponds to the parameter that controls the true duration dependence, θ. For example,
while b1 < 1 implies that perceptions under-react to variation in job finding across individuals, θ̂ < θ
implies that perceptions change even less with variation in job finding over the spell.
We can identify any additional true duration dependence in beliefs that is separate from true duration
dependence in job finding (i.e., θ̂ 6= θ) using the variances of perceived job finding and the covariances of
actual and perceived job finding over the spell of unemployment. Intuitively, more true depreciation in
perceived job finding (higher θ̂) implies a lower variance of perceived job finding and a lower covariance
between actual and perceived job finding at higher durations of unemployment. We again develop this
identification argument formally in Appendix Section E.4.
We add the variance of perceived job finding and the covariance with actual job finding at different
duration intervals as additional moments to estimate the new parameter θ̂. Column 14 of Appendix
Table E4 shows the estimation results, which are very similar to the baseline model. The slope coefficient
is almost identical (b1 = 0.52) and the duration-dependence parameter θ is 0.022, which is small and
very close to the 0.017 in the baseline model. The corresponding beliefs parameter θ̂ is slightly larger
at 0.037, but note that the change in perceptions over the unemployment spell depends on both the
parameter θ̂ as well as b1. More precisely, while θ̂ is slightly larger than θ and thus T̂
3
i,d declines more
over the spell than T 3i,d, to get to the change in Z
3
i,d, the change in T̂
3
i,d is multiplied by b1 = 0.52. As
shown in Table E4, the extended model predicts a decline of actual job finding at the individual level
of 8.9 percentage points over the first 12 months of the unemployment spell, whereas the decline in
perceived job finding equals 8.2 percentage points. The fact that the perceived and actual job finding
decline at similar and modest rates over the spell, indicates that there is limited scope for learning
from remaining unemployed.26 We note that the fact that perceptions decline slightly at the individual
26This is also illustrated in Appendix Figure E2, which shows the difference in actual and perceived job finding by duration
of unemployment in the estimated extended model. It shows that at the individual level, there is almost no change in the
bias by duration of unemployment. The figure also implies that the optimistic bias of the long term unemployed is almost
entirely driven by the dynamic selection of over-optimistic individuals into long-term unemployment.
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Restricted Versions of the Baseline Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Moments Baseline θ = 0
No heterog.
στ = 0 b1 = 1
b0 = 0
in Ti,d b1 = 1
V ar0(T
3
i,0) 0.076 0.079 0.000 0.085 0.051 0.047
V ar0(T
3
i ) 0.057 0.065 0.000 0.085 0.040 0.033
LD 0.070 0.000 0.430 -0.116 0.054 0.071
1− LD/TD (in %) 84.71 100.00 0.000 125.67 82.20 77.53
Weighted SSR 0.470 0.695 49.198 2.514 12.251 21.613
Notes: The table reports selected moments of the estimation of restricted versions of the baseline model.
The moments capture the heterogeneity and duration dependence in true 3-month job-finding probabil-
ities. TD stands for the total decline in true job finding over the first 12 months of the unemployment
spell, LD stands for the longitudinal decline in true job finding, and 1 − LD
TD
is the share of the total
decline that the model attributes to selection, see the notes in Table 5 for details. Column 1 reports the
results for the baseline model; column 2 reports the results for a model with no true duration dependence
in job finding; column 3 reports the results for a model with no (permanent and transitory) heterogeneity
in job finding; column 4 reports the results for a model with no transitory heterogeneity in job finding;
column 5 reports results of a model with no slope bias in elicitations; and column 6 reports the results
for a model with no intercept and slope bias in elicitations.
level is still consistent with our positive within-spell estimates in the empirical section because of the
presence of mean reversion in transitory job finding. We also note, not surprisingly, that the fit of the
restricted model in column 15 where θ̂ = θ is close to the fit of the unrestricted version in column 14.
4.6 Robustness
We study the robustness of our results when using alternative specifications, alternative moments, and
alternative functional forms and distributions.
We have aimed to parametrize our model as parsimoniously as possible. To illustrate this, we
estimate a number of versions of the model where we restrict parameter choices as reported in Table
6 (see also the Appendix Table E2, which reports all the estimated parameters). Regarding the actual
job-finding rates, we first estimate a version of the model where we do not allow for any true depreciation
in job-finding rates, θ = 0 (column 2). Unsurprisingly, this model version fits the data nearly as well
as the baseline. In contrast, when we estimate a version of the model where we do not allow for any
heterogeneity in Ti,d, the model fits the data very poorly (column 3). The two versions jointly underline
the relative importance of heterogeneity relative to true duration dependence to explain the empirical
moments. We also estimate a version of the model, where we set only στ = 0, i.e., we do not allow for
any transitory changes in job finding. As shown in column (4) of Appendix Table E2, this specification
has difficulty in matching both cZd,Fd and cZd,Fd+3 . The version without transitory shocks implies a
much larger extent of heterogeneity in Ti and, as a result, an appreciation of the job-finding rates over
the unemployment spell (θ < 0). Given our estimation procedure leveraging elicitations to learn about
heterogeneity in types, it proves to be important to allow for transitory heterogeneity.
Regarding the perceived job-finding rates, we estimate a version of the model where we do not allow
for any under-response to differences in job finding (column 5 with b1 = 1). The fit gets substantially
worse, indicating the importance of allowing for the slope bias. Very similar results are obtained when
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adding also the restriction that the intercept bias equals zero (column 6 with b0 = 0).
We also assess the estimated heterogeneity in our statistical model using the variation in job finding
that is not predictable based on observable characteristics. To this purpose, we estimate the model on
a set of moments obtained from the residuals of regressions of the 3-month belief question and of the
3-month job-finding rate on demographic controls (the same set of controls as used for the regressions
reported in Table 2). The estimation results are shown in Table E4 in the Appendix and are similar to
the baseline results, with the role played by true duration dependence being close to zero. Of course,
the extent of heterogeneity is smaller, as the effects of observables are parsed out from all moments. We
also obtain a comparable estimate for b1 (0.559), which suggests that the relationship between observed
heterogeneity in job finding and beliefs is similar as the relationship between unobserved heterogeneity
in job finding and beliefs.
We finally probe the robustness of our findings to alternative assumptions about functional form and
distributions as well as extensions of the model, as reported in Appendix Tables E3 and E4. Without
discussing these estimates in detail, the tables show that the parameter estimates are very stable across
the different specifications. In particular, our results are robust to assuming that Ti follows the Gamma
distribution, and to assuming that ε follows a truncated normal distribution, which no longer satisfies
mean-independence of the error term. Our results are also robust to assuming piecewise linear true
duration dependence instead of geometric depreciation and extending the horizon of the model from 2
to 5 years. We also find that our results are robust to fully persistent elicitation errors (i.e., εi,d = εi)
and bunching at 0, 0.5 and 1 of the elicited beliefs. Furthermore, we report the results for a model,
where a share α of individuals has random elicitations (Z3i,d = b0 + ε) and a share 1 − α correctly
perceives their job finding prospects (Z3i,d = T
3
i,d). The model results are very similar to our baseline,
and the value of 1−α is close to the value of b1, suggesting that b1 in our baseline may instead capture
the share of individuals who perceive their job finding prospects correctly. Finally, results are also very
similar when excluding individuals with recall expectations when generating the data moments, when
restricting the set of moments by using only 0-6 and 7+ months for the time intervals and dropping the
mean of monthly innovations, so that the model is exactly identified, or when using the inverse of the
bootstrapped variances as weights instead of the full variance-covariance matrix.
5 Structural Model of Job Search with Biased Beliefs
In the statistical model we have estimated the heterogeneity and true duration dependence in perceived
and true job finding, but abstracted from the underlying behavior of job seekers and how it depends on
their beliefs. We now study this relation between beliefs and job search in a McCall type model, which
we then calibrate to quantify the impact of biases in beliefs on the incidence of long-term unemployment.
We consider a stylized version of McCall’s search model in which agents decide how to set their
reservation wage. We allow for heterogeneity and true duration dependence in both the perceived and
true arrival rates of wage offers, denoted by λ̂i,d and λi,d respectively.
27 Wage offers are drawn from a
27In order to provide tractable characterizations of the impact on job finding and on duration dependence, all the action
in terms of heterogeneity, dynamics and biases is introduced through the arrival rates. As we assume that the wage offer
distribution is known, optimal search behavior is represented by a simple reservation price rule (see Rothschild [1974] and
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. The perceived value of unemployment for agent i at duration d
equals








[Vi (w)− Ui,d+1)] dF (w)},
where δ is the discount rate, u(bu) is the per-period utility flow when unemployed and Vi (w) is the value
of being employed at wage w. The value of employment follows a similar structure, given an arrival rate
of offers, λe, and accounting for an exogenous job separation rate, σ. For our analytical derivations, we
set λe = σ = 0, but we relax this in the numerical analysis. A job seeker sets her reservation wage Ri,d to
maximize her perceived continuation value at any time of the unemployment spell. At this reservation
wage, the agent is indifferent between accepting a job and remaining unemployed, Ui,d = V (Ri,d). The
resulting actual and perceived job-finding rate for agent i at time t equal
Ti,d = λi,d (1− F (Ri,d)) and Zi,d = λ̂i,d (1− F (Ri,d)) (15)
respectively, corresponding to the actual and perceived job-finding rates in our statistical model.
We assume two types of job seekers: a high type h and a low type l, with λh > λl, and φ denoting the
share of job seekers with a high arrival rate. For both types of job seekers, the arrival rate depreciates
at geometric rate θ. As in the statistical model, we allow for three types of biases in job seekers’ beliefs,
but now applied to the arrival rates. First, job seekers may be subject to a uniform bias B0. That is,
any type’s arrival rate is perceived as λ̂j = λj +B0. Second, job seekers misperceive their employability
type with probability 1 − B1. That is, Prob(λ̂i,0 = λ̂j |λi,0 = λj) = B1. This is a parsimonious way to
capture that job seekers’ beliefs may under-react to their differences in risk. Finally, job seekers perceive
a depreciation rate of their arrival rates of Bθθ.
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Biased Beliefs The setup allows us to illustrate a key behavioral mechanism in the presence of
biased beliefs. When a job seeker’s employment prospects change, she adapts her job search strategy
to mitigate the impact on her employment chances. This response, however, only comes into play when
the change in employment prospects is perceived. In our model, when the arrival rate of offers increases
for a job seeker, this mechanically increases the job-finding rate. However, the job seeker becomes more
selective and increases her reservation wage (and thus decreases the job-finding rate), but only to the
extent that the increase in the arrival rate is perceived. The mechanical and behavioral effect thus work
Bikhchandani and Sharma [1996]) and this is not affected by the dynamics we introduce in the perceived arrival rate.
We abstract away from other potential biases. See Dubra [2004] and Conlon et al. [2018] for models with varying priors
regarding the wage offer distribution and learning based on the received wage offers. See Spinnewijn [2015] for a model of
search efforts with biased beliefs, distinguishing between baseline beliefs - regarding the baseline probability of job finding
- and control beliefs - regarding the increase in the job-finding probability when searching more.
28The arrival rate of worker i of type j after d periods of unemployment equals λi,d = (1− θ)d λj , while the perceived
arrival rate equals λ̂i,d = (1−Bθθ)d λj +B0 with probability B1 and λ̂i,d = (1−Bθθ)d λ−j +B0 otherwise. Note that our
model ignores additional random errors in the beliefs, which we cannot credibly separate from noise in the elicitations.
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in opposite directions:29
dT = [1− F (R)]dλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mechanical Effect





















≥ 0, as shown in Appendix F. Importantly, the mitigating
behavioral effect is proportional to dλ̂i/dλi, highlighting the impact biased beliefs have on actual un-
employment outcomes. For the same true arrival rates, job seekers who are more optimistic about their
employment prospects take actions that cause them to exit unemployment more slowly.
Heterogeneity vs. True Duration Dependence The wedge between the true and perceived
arrival rates, either across agents or over the unemployment spell, changes the observed duration depen-
dence in job-finding rates. Giving the mitigating impact of job seekers’ behavior, any difference across
job seekers’ or over the unemployment spell that is not perceived leads to larger differences in actual job
finding. This implies stronger observed negative duration dependence in job finding and thus a higher
incidence of long-term unemployment. In our model, we can state:
Proposition 1. Starting from a stationary, single-agent model (θ = 0, λh = λl = λ̄) and assuming
κ < min{1/B1, λ0/Bθ}:
i. A mean-preserving spread in the true arrival rates (λh > λl for φ = 1/2) introduces observed
negative duration dependence in the job-finding rates,
E1(Ti,1)
E0(Ti,0)
< 1, and at a higher rate when
B1 < 1.
ii. Geometric depreciation in the true arrival rates (θ > 0) introduces observed negative duration
dependence in the job-finding rates,
Ed+1(Ti,d+1)
Ed(Ti,d)
< 1, and at a higher rate when Bθ < 1.
See Appendix F.1.1 for the proof. First, when arrival rates are heterogeneous across job seekers,
those with lower resulting job-finding rates are more likely to remain unemployed. Following equations
(1) and (2), the dynamic selection is stronger the larger the variance in job-finding rates. We can
29While we introduce variation in job finding through the arrival rates, it is important to note that the mechanical and
behavioral effect would continue to have opposite signs when changing the mean of the wage offer distribution instead,
like in Conlon et al. [2018]. A more favorable wage offer distribution increases job finding for a given reservation wage,
but workers would increase their reservation wage if this is perceived. See Dubra [2004] for general conditions under which
optimistic job seekers remain unemployed for longer. The mechanical and behavioral effect have also opposite signs in a
model with endogenous search, like in Spinnewijn [2015], when varying the baseline probability of finding employment,
keeping the returns to search fixed. The two effects would have the same sign, however, when varying the returns to search
instead; job seekers with higher returns to search find jobs at a higher rate and search more if they perceive the higher
returns. In contrast with the other three sources of heterogeneity, this final source of heterogeneity would give rise to a
positive correlation between job finding and the optimistic bias, which is opposite to what we find in the data.
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approximate this variance at the start of the spell for limited heterogeneity (λi = λ̄+ dλi) by
vard (T ) ∼= vard
(







1 + κ2 − 2κ(2B1 − 1)
]
vard (dλ) . (19)
The approximation shows that the variance in job-finding rates is increasing in the heterogeneity in true
arrival rates, but less so the more this heterogeneity is perceived.30
Second, the evolution of job-finding rates over the spell depends on how the arrival rates evolves




Ed (λd+1 [1− F (Rd+1)])
Ed (λd [1− F (Rd)])
.
Any depreciation of the arrival rates translates mechanically into observed negative duration dependence
in the job-finding rates. However, when job seekers perceive the depreciation in arrival rates, they will
adjust their reservation wages and thus the acceptance rates. Starting from a stationary setting, the










where the behavioral effect is again scaled by the perception of the depreciation Bθ. As the perceived
depreciation lowers the arrival rates more later in the spell, it induces workers to lower the reservation
wage more later in the spell, translating into a larger increase in the acceptance rate later on. This
behavioral response thus works in the opposite direction as the mechanical effect.
In sum, both heterogeneity and true duration dependence cause the observed duration dependence
in job-finding rates to be magnified when the respective force is under-estimated. Making job seekers’
beliefs more accurate would thus reduce the observed duration dependence and the incidence of long-
term unemployment.
Numerical Analysis We now calibrate our structural model to quantify the effect of beliefs on
the incidence of long-term unemployment. As in the statistical model, the targeted moments include the
empirical true and perceived job-finding rates for the short-, medium- and long-term unemployed. But
rather than targeting the covariances between true and perceived job-finding rates, we directly target
the true duration dependence in job finding as estimated in the statistical model.31 In particular, we
target the ratio of the sample average of job finding when long-term unemployed (> 6 months) vs. the
sample average of job finding when short-term unemployed (≤ 6 months). This ratio is estimated to be
30The argument regarding the variance holds at any duration d, but its impact on observed duration dependence is
normalized by Ed (Ti,d) (1− Ed (Ti,d)). Hence, changes in the average job-finding rate Ed (Ti,d) can lead to offsetting
effects for d > 0, while the job-finding rate at d = 0 remains constant for a mean-preserving spread.
31Appendix F.2 provides further details on the calibration. While in theory it is possible to perform the same estimation
exercise in the structural model as in the reduced form statistical model, fitting our cross-sectional data moments requires
a large number of types, which is computationally challenging, given that we need to solve the decision problem for each
type.
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Table 7: Counterfactual Simulations in Structural Model
Calibrated Eliminating
Model Biases
Panel A. Baseline Model
Average Unemployment Duration 4.01 3.95
Share of Long-Term Unemployed 0.295 0.271
Panel B. High-Depreciation Model
Average Unemployment Duration 4.00 3.86
Share of Long-Term Unemployed 0.293 0.267
Notes: The table reports selected moments for the calibrated model and a
counterfactual simulation where all biases in the respective model are eliminated
(B0 = 1, B1 = Bθ = 1). Panel A uses the baseline calibration of the structural
model, while panel B uses a calibration with a higher individual-level deprecia-
tion in true job-finding probabilities. Both calibrations match the same set of
moments otherwise (see Appendix Table F1).
0.90 in the statistical model. We gauge the sensitivity of our results to setting this target ratio at 0.75,
which is below any estimate from the statistical model. The estimated parameters minimize the sum of
squared differences between data moments and simulated moments from the model. We closely match
our targeted moments and also obtain plausible values for standard labor market statistics, as shown
and discussed in Appendix F.2.
The calibrated model allows illustrating the opposing mechanical and behavioral effects of hetero-
geneity and depreciation in the arrival rates (see Appendix Figure F1). In line with Proposition 1, we
find that a 10 percent increase in the spread of arrival rates increases the share of unemployed workers
who are unemployed for longer than 6 months by 28 percent, which is reduced to 24 percent if also
the correlation between the actual and perceived arrival rates is increased by 10 percent. Similarly,
increasing the depreciation rate from its baseline level to the high level, corresponding to our two cali-
bration models respectively, the share of LT unemployed increases by 16 percent, but the impact would
be mitigated to an increase of 13 percent if the change in depreciation were perceived as such.
Table 7 shows the impact of eliminating the biases in beliefs on the incidence of LT unemployment.
When we eliminate all three biases jointly (B0 = 0, B1 = Bθ = 1), the share of LT unemployed decreases
significantly by 8.1 percent (2.4 p.p.) while the average unemployment duration is only slightly lower.
Interestingly, the results are qualitatively similar for the calibrated model with a high depreciation rate.
While the effect on the average unemployment duration is slightly larger, the effect on the share of LT
unemployed is basically the same at 8.9 percent. The model’s prediction that biased beliefs contribute
substantially to the high incidence of LT unemployment seems robust to the relative importance of
heterogeneity vs. true duration dependence in the actual arrival rates. This is not too surprising as job
seekers’ perceptions under-react to the overall variation in job finding in both calibrations. In line with
Proposition 1, both under-reacting to the cross-sectional and to the longitudinal variation increases
the incidence of LT unemployment. Expressed as the ratio of the LT vs. ST unemployment rate, we
conclude that 11− 12 percent of the high incidence of LT unemployment in our model is explained by
biased beliefs. We view this as a clear lower bound as we focus only on systematic biases in beliefs but
ignore random errors in perceptions as an additional source of bias.
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6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes job seekers’ perceptions about their employment prospects and how these percep-
tions relate to employment outcomes. We have offered three sets of results:
We have documented empirically (1) that reported beliefs have strong predictive power for actual job
finding, (2) that job seekers are over-optimistic in their beliefs, particularly the long-term unemployed,
and (3) that job seekers do not revise their beliefs downward when remaining unemployed.
We have then developed a novel framework, where we show how the relation between beliefs and
ex-post realizations can be used to disentangle heterogeneity and true duration dependence in job-
finding rates. Using this framework, we find that the reported beliefs reveal a substantial amount of
heterogeneity in true job-finding rates, accounting for most of the observed decline in job-finding rates
over the spell of unemployment. Moreover, we find that job seekers’ beliefs are systematically biased and
under-respond to differences in job-finding rates across job seekers. Job seekers with a low job-finding
probability are over-optimistic and select into long-term unemployment without adjusting their beliefs
downward.
We have also shown in a model of job search how biases in beliefs contribute to the slow exit
out of unemployment and the incidence of long-term unemployment. Unemployed workers with worse
employment prospects are over-optimistic, setting their reservation wage too high and not sufficiently
adjusting it as the unemployment spell progresses. Calibrating this model, we find that this mechanism
significantly increases the incidence of long-term unemployment.
Our analysis demonstrates the broader value of having data on both expectations and realizations
for the same individuals over time. In our context, the data allow us to learn about job seeker’s true
employment prospects, providing us with a novel identification strategy to separate dynamic selection
and true duration dependence, with well-known implications with regard to a broad range of labor
market policies. Further, the data allow us to learn about biases in the perceived employment prospects
and to study their interplay with behavior in determining unemployment outcomes. We believe this
opens up an important area of research with again wide-ranging policy implications. Our findings for
example raise the question of whether biases in beliefs amplify the rise of long-term unemployment
in recessions. If unemployed workers fail to adjust their beliefs about their employment prospects in
response to developments in the aggregate labor market, the lack of a behavioral response is likely to
lead to greater unemployment levels than would otherwise be the case.
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Honoré, Bo E., “Identification Results for Duration Models with Multiple Spells,” Review of Economic
Studies, 1993, 60 (1), 241–246.
Hornstein, Andreas, Per Krusell, and Giovanni L. Violante, “Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search
Models: A Quantitative Assessment,” American Economic Review, December 2011, 101 (7), 2873–
98.
Jacobson, Louis S., Robert J. LaLonde, and Daniel G. Sullivan, “Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers,”
The American Economic Review, 1993, 83 (4), 685–709.
Jaeger, Simon, Benjamin Schoefer, Samuel Young, and Josef Zweimuller, “Wages and the Value of
37
Nonemployment,” 2020. Forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Jarosch, Gregor and Laura Pilossoph, “Statistical Discrimination and Duration Dependence in the Job
Finding Rate,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2018, 86 (4), 1631–1665.
Kolsrud, Jonas, Camille Landais, Peter Nilsson, and Johannes Spinnewijn, “The Optimal Timing of UI
Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden,” American Economic Review, 2018, 108 (4-5), 985–1033.
Koszegi, Botond, “Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice,” Journal of the European Economic
Association, 2006, 4 (4), 673–707.
Kroft, Kory, Fabian Lange, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, “Duration Dependence and Labor Market
Conditions: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2013,
128 (3), 1123–1167.
, , , and Lawrence F. Katz, “Long-Term Unemployment and the Great Recession: The Role of
Composition, Duration Dependence and Non-Participation,” Journal of Labor Economics, 2016, 34,
S7–S54.
Krueger, Alan B. and Andreas I. Mueller, “Job Search, Emotional Well-Being, and Job Finding in a
Period of Mass Unemployment: Evidence from High-Frequency Longitudinal Data,” Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, Spring 2011, 1 (1), 1–70.
and , “A Contribution to the Empirics of Reservation Wages,” American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy, February 2016, 8 (1), 142–179.
Lancaster, Tony, “Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemployment,” Econometrica, 1979, 47
(4), 939–56.
Ljungqvist, Lars and Thomas J. Sargent, “The European Unemployment Dilemma,” Journal of Political
Economy, June 1998, 106 (3), 514–550.
Lockwood, Ben, “Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of Unemployment,”
Review of Economic Studies, 1991, 58 (4), 733–753.
Machin, Stephen and Alan Manning, “The Causes and Consequences of Longterm Unemployment in
Europe,” in Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Part
C of Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, 1999, pp. 3085 – 3139.
Manski, Charles F., “Measuring Expectations,” Econometrica, September 2004, 72 (5), 1329–1376.
Marinescu, Ioana and Daphne Skandalis, “Unemployment Insurance and Job Search Behavior,” Novem-
ber 2019. Mimeo.
McCall, J. J., “Economics of Information and Job Search,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970,
84 (1), 113–126.
Morrison, William and Dmitry Taubinsky, “Rules of Thumb and Attention Elasticities: Evidence from
Under- and Overreaction to Taxes,” 2019. Mimeo.
Pavoni, Nicola, “Optimal Unemployment Insurance, With Human Capital Depreciation, and Duration
Dependence,” International Economic Review, 2009, 50 (2), 323–362.
and G. L. Violante, “Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2007,
38
74 (1), 283–318.
Pissarides, C., “Loss of Skill during Unemployment and the Persistence of Employment Shocks,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992, 107, 1371–1391.
Rabin, Matthew and Dimitri Vayanos, “The Gambler’s and Hot-Hand Fallacies: Theory and Applica-
tions,” Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 77 (2), 730–778.
Rothschild, Michael, “Searching for the Lowest Price When the Distribution of Prices Is Unknown,”
Journal of Political Economy, 1974, 82 (4), 689–711.
Schmieder, Johannes F. and Till von Wachter, “The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New
Evidence and Interpretation,” Annual Review of Economics, 2016, 8 (1), 547–581.
Shimer, Robert and Ivan Werning, “On the Optimal Timing of Benefits with Heterogeneous Workers
and Human Capital Depreciation,” NBER Working Papers 12230, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc May 2006.
Spinnewijn, Johannes, “Training and search during unemployment,” Journal of Public Economics, 2013,
99, 49 – 65.
, “Unemployed but Optimistic: Optimal Insurance Design with Biased Beliefs,” Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association, 2015, 13 (1), 130–167.
Stephens, Melvin, “Job Loss Expectations, Realizations, and Household Consumption Behavior,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2004, 86 (1), 253–269.
Wiswall, Matthew and Basit Zafar, “Determinants of College Major Choice: Identification using an
Information Experiment,” The Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82 (2), 791–824.
Wunsch, Conny, “Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 2013, 95 (3), 1030–1045.
39
Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
A Survey Questions
A.1 Survey of Consumer Expectations
Question about 12-Month Job Finding Prospect
What do you think is the percent chance that within the coming 12 months, you will find a job that you
will accept, considering the pay and type of work?
[Ruler & box]
Question about 3-Month Job Finding Prospect
And looking at the more immediate future, what do you think is the percent chance that within the
coming 3 months, you will find a job that you will accept, considering the pay and type of work?
[Ruler & box]
A.2 Krueger-Mueller Survey
Question about 1-Month Job Finding Prospect
What do you think is the percent chance that you will be employed again within the next 4 weeks?
Please move the red button on the bar below to select the percent chance, where 0% means ’absolutely
no chance’ and 100% means ’absolutely certain’.
Survey of Unemployed Workers in New Jersey  
Week f: 1/31/10 - 2/6/10 
[SRI Note: This page is shown every fourth week.]  
Next we would like to ask you a few questions related to your chances of finding a job. If 
you have already found a job, you can go on to the next page.  
What do you think is the percent chance that you will be employed again within the next 4 weeks?  
 
Please move the red button on the bar below to select the percent chance, where 0% means 
'absolutely no chance' and 100% means 'absolutely certain'. 
   
[SRI Note: This question is omitted the first time the page is displayed.]  
During the last 4 weeks, did anything happen that made you more or less optimistic about your 
chances of finding a job? Please select all that apply.  
 
How many weeks do you estimate it will actually take before you will be employed again? 
[q52a] Do you think your chances of finding a job would increase if you spent more time searching 
for a job? 
[SRI Note: If yes, display q52b]  
How many weeks do you estimate it would take to become employed again if you spent an 
additional hour searching for a job every day? 








  [q53a] I spent more time searching for a job than usual 
  [q53b] I spent less time searching for a job than usual 
  [q53c] I realized that the impact of my search efforts is different from what I expected 
  [q53d] I realized that there are more jobs available than I expected 
  [q53e] I realized that there are fewer jobs available than I expected 
  [q53f] I realized that many jobs pay less than I would be willing to accept 
  [q53g] I realized that many employers think I'm not qualified for the position available 










[NB: Initial position on bar is randomized.]
Question about Expected Duration
How many weeks do you estimate it will actually take before you will be employed again?
Weeks
1
B Descriptive Statistics and Sample Comparisons
This appendix provides additional descriptive statistics for both surveys, for the main samples used
in the analysis and a series of sub-samples. Table B1 shows statistics for the SCE, while Table B2
shows statistics for the KM survey. In both tables, column 1 shows the full sample of unemployed,
column 2 shows the main sample used in the longitudinal analysis and column 3 shows the main sample
used for the analysis of predictive power of beliefs. The samples statistics are very similar across the
different main samples, except for the sample in column 3 for the KM survey, which is substantially
smaller and somewhat selected. Columns 4 and 5, shows descriptive statistics for the short- and the
long-term unemployed. The long-term unemployed in both surveys are older and more female, though
little differences exist by education. Finally, columns 6 and 7 show descriptive statistics separately
by number of surveys completed. In the SCE, attrition appears to be non-random with respect to
education, though survey weights adjust for this. Reassuringly, the monthly job-finding rate is similar
across the two samples. In the KM survey, attrition also appears non-random, but again survey weights
adjust for this. Moreover, the sample in column 7 with two surveys or more, which is the variation we use
for the longitudinal analysis in the KM data, is similar to the full weekly panel, which is representative
of the UI population in New Jersey over the survey period.
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Table B1: Sample Comparison in the SCE
Unemployed: Unemployed:
Main samples Sub-samples of sample (2)
(in %) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High-School Degree or Less 44.5 42.1 43.7 42.1 42.0 46.6 39.4
Some College Education 32.4 32.6 30.3 30.3 34.5 35.9 30.6
College Degree or More 23.1 25.4 26.0 27.6 23.5 17.5 29.9
Ages 20-34 25.4 23.8 21.2 29.4 19.1 29.9 20.3
Ages 35-49 33.5 34.4 33.1 34.5 34.4 32.8 35.4
Ages 50-65 41.1 41.7 45.7 36.1 46.5 37.4 44.2
Female 59.3 58.0 55.3 53.3 62.0 60.6 56.6
Black 19.1 18.2 14.3 17.9 18.5 19.9 17.2
Hispanic 12.5 12.2 11.0 13.2 11.4 11.3 12.8
Monthly job-finding rate 18.7 18.2 17.3 24.2 13.2 18.9 18.0
# respondents 948 882 494 513 479 395 487
# respondents w/ > 1 survey 534 477 278 260 239 166 311
# survey responses 2,597 2,281 1,201 1,070 1,211 756 1,525
Notes: All samples are restricted to ages 20-65. Survey weights are used to compute the descriptive
statistics. The table shows descriptive statistics in the SCE for (1) all unemployed, (2) all unemployed
where the sample was trimmed from observations with inconsistent elicitations between the 3-month and
the 12-month probability, and (3) the same sample as in (2) but in addition limited to interviews with at
least 3 consecutive monthly follow-up interviews (used to measure 3-month job finding). Sample (2) is
the baseline sample in our paper and sample (3) is used for the analysis of the predictive power of beliefs
in Section 3.3. Sub-sample (4) consists of unemployed workers of durations 0-6 months and sub-sample
(5) of unemployed workers of duration of 7 or more months. Sub-sample (6) consists of those in the main
sample (2) with less than 9 interviews over the 12 months of the SCE and sub-sample (7) consists of
those in the main sample (2) with at least 9 interviews over the 12 months of the SCE.
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Table B2: Sample Comparison in the KM Survey
Monthly panel: Monthly panel:
Weekly Main samples Sub-samples of (2)
(in %) panel (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
High-School Degree or Less 32.6 32.5 32.4 30.2 32.8 32.3 39.6 29.3
Some College Education 38.0 37.4 37.4 36.7 37.0 37.5 38.0 37.1
College Degree or More 29.5 30.1 30.2 33.0 30.2 30.2 22.4 33.7
Ages 20-34 35.3 38.1 38.7 21.7 44.9 35.7 55.1 31.4
Ages 35-49 36.5 35.4 34.8 31.8 35.8 34.3 31.8 36.2
Ages 50-65 28.2 26.5 26.5 46.4 19.3 30.0 13.1 32.4
Female 48.1 48.6 47.3 42.7 46.2 47.8 50.2 46.0
Black 22.8 24.4 24.1 15.2 23.0 24.6 30.7 21.1
Hispanic 23.6 27.5 27.8 16.9 33.7 24.9 31.8 26.0
Monthly job-finding rate 11.1 10.3 10.5 10.5 13.5 9.5 — 9.2
# respondents 4,939 2,384 2,278 552 397 1,884 744 1,534
# respondents w/ > 1 survey 3,835 1,422 1,296 121 175 1,118 0 1,296
# survey responses 27,021 4,803 4,435 734 572 3,863 744 3,691
Notes: All samples are restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65. Survey weights are used to compute the
descriptive statistics. The table shows descriptive statistics for the full weekly panel of the KM survey, as well
as statistics for (1) the full monthly panel with elicitations about job finding , (2) the same sample as in (1)
but trimmed for observations with inconsistencies between the elicitation of the 1-month probability and the
expected remaining duration, and (3) the same sample as in (2) but in addition limited to interviews with at
least 4 consecutive weekly follow-up interviews (used to measure 1-month job finding). Sample (2) is the baseline
sample in our paper and sample (3) is used for the analysis of the predictive power of beliefs. Sub-sample (4)
consists of unemployed workers of durations 0-6 months and sub-sample (5) of unemployed workers of duration of
7 or more months. Sub-sample (6) consists of those in the main sample (2) with only 1 interview in the monthly
panel and sub-sample (2) consists of those with more than 1 interview in the monthly panel.
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C Theoretical Derivations in Conceptual Framework
This appendix provides the derivations underlying the characterizations in Section 3.1.
Decomposition of Observed Duration Dependence We first establish the following result
linking the expectations at different durations:






















di = 1− Sd+1
Sd
.
























































which proves the earlier statement.
The decomposition of the observed duration dependence immediately follows from applying equation
(20) to the average job finding. That is,





covd (Ti,d, Ti,d+1) = covd (Ti,d, Ti,d + (Ti,d+1 − Ti,d))
= vard (Ti,d)− covd (Ti,d, Ti,d − Ti,d+1) .
5
Lower Bound on Heterogeneity We first note that
covd (Zi,d, Fi,d) = Ed (Zi,dFi,d)− Ed (Zi,d)Ed (Fi,d)
= Ed (Ed (Zi,dFi,d|Ti,d))− Ed (Zi,d)Ed (Ti,d)
= Ed (Ed (Zi,d × 1|Ti,d) Pr (Fi,d = 1|Ti,d) + Ed (Zi,d × 0|Ti,d) Pr (Fi,d = 0|Ti,d))− Ed (Zi,d)Ed (Ti,d)
= Ed (Ed (Zi,dTi,d|Ti,d))− Ed (Zi,d)Ed (Ti,d)
= Ed (Zi,dTi,d)− Ed (Zi,d)Ed (Ti,d)
= covd (Zi,d, Ti,d) .
Now we can use the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
vard (Ti,d) vard (Zi,d) ≥ covd (Zi,d, Ti,d)2
= covd (Zi,d, Fi,d)
2 .






We next use Proposition 3 in Morrison and Taubinsky [2019] to derive a second lower bound using
two measurements of the beliefs, Z1i,d and Z
2
i,d, which requires that both are independently distributed
conditional on Ti,d (i.e., Z
1








































− Ed (α (Ti,d))2







= covd (Ti,d, α (Ti,d)) .
So we can combine these expressions with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
vard (Ti,d) vard (α (Ti,d)) ≥ covd (Ti,d, α (Ti,d))2




















Note that if the two measurements are positively correlated, conditional on Ti,d, the lower bound






≥ var (α (Ti,d)).
6
Linear Beliefs Model For the linear beliefs model, we have
Ed (Zi,d) = b0 + b1Ed (Ti,d) for any d.
Hence, it trivially follows that
b1 =
Ed+1 (Zi,d+1)− Ed (Zi,d)
Ed+1 (Ti,d+1)− Ed (Ti,d)
.




× covd (Fi,d, Zi,d) =
Ed+1 (Ti,d+1)− Ed (Ti,d)
Ed+1 (Zi,d+1)− Ed (Zi,d)
× covd (Fi,d, Zi,d)
We also note that with two elicitations Z1i,d and Z
2





























But this is only the case when the error terms are independently distributed. The covariance ratio
becomes a lower bound when the error terms are positively correlated.
Persistence in Job Finding For the linear beliefs model, it naturally follows that
covd+1 (Fi,d+1, Zi,d) = b1covd+1 (Ti,d+1, Ti,d) .
This term relates to the dynamic selection term contributing to the observed duration dependence in job
finding, but is backward-looking rather than forward-looking. We characterize this relationship in case
the job finding probability consists of a permanent term and a random transitory term, independently
drawn every period,
Ti,d = Ti + τi,d.
Here, the forward-looking covariance simplifies to the variance in the persistent component,
covd (Ti,d+1, Ti,d) = vard (Ti) .
7
The backward-looking covariance can be re-expressed as
covd+1 (Ti,d+1, Ti,d) = covd+1 (Ti + τi,d+1, Ti + τi,d)
= Ed+1 ((Ti + τi,d+1) (Ti + τi,d))− Ed+1 (Ti + τi,d+1)Ed+1 (Ti + τi,d)
= Ed+1 [Ed+1 ((Ti + τi,d+1) (Ti + τi,d) |Ti)]
−Ed+1 [Ed+1 (Ti + τi,d+1|Ti)]Ed+1 [Ed+1 (Ti + τi,d|Ti)]
= Ed+1
(
T 2i + Tiτi,d
)
− Ed+1 (Ti)Ed+1 (Ti + τi,d)
= vard+1(Ti) + covd+1(Ti, τi,d)
Here, we can apply the characterization of the conditional expectation in (20) to re-express













































− (Ed+1 (Ti)− Ed (Ti)) vard (τi,d)
]
=




vard (Ti) vard (τi,d)
[1− Ed (Ti,d)]2
where we have used








































covd+1 (Ti,d+1, Ti,d) = vard+1(Ti)−
vard (Ti) vard (τi,d)
[1− Ed (Ti,d)]2
while instead
covd+1 (Ti,d+1, Ti,d+1) = vard+1(Ti) + vard+1 (τi,d+1) = vard+1(Ti) + vard (τi,d )
8
Putting the two expressions together, we obtain






which shows that the difference in the contemporaneous covariance and lagged covariance is increasing
in the variance in transitory shocks, but decreasing in the variance in the permanent shocks. Combined
with
covd (Ti,d, Ti,d) = vard (Ti) + vard (τi,d)
and, for the linear beliefs model,
covd+1 (Fi,d+1, Zi,d) = b1covd+1 (Ti,d+1, Ti,d)
covd+1 (Fi,d+1, Zi,d+1) = b1covd+1 (Ti,d+1, Ti,d+1)
covd+1 (Fi,d, Zi,d) = b1covd (Ti,d, Ti,d)
we can use the difference in contemporaneous and lagged covariance to get an estimate of the variance
in transitory shocks.
9
D Additional Empirical Results
In this appendix, we provide additional results on the empirical analysis that we refer to in the paper for
both the SCE and the KM survey. More precisely, we provide (1) additional details on the distributions
of elicitations and their correlations, (2) additional details and a series of robustness checks on the
predictive power of beliefs and the non-parametric lower bounds, (3) additional details on the biases
in beliefs and a detailed robustness analysis of the longitudinal changes in beliefs, (4) evidence on the
relationship of beliefs, job search effort and reservation wages in the KM data, and (5) evidence on the
relationship between beliefs and indicators of labor market tightness in the SCE.
D.1 Elicited Beliefs about Job Finding
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Notes: Survey weights are used and the sample is restricted to unemployed
workers, ages 20-65.
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Notes: Survey weights are used and the sample is restricted to unemployed
workers, ages 20-65.
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Elicited 1−Month Job−Finding Probability
Imputed from Elicited Remaining Duration
Notes: Survey weights are used and the samples are restricted to un-
employed workers, ages 20-65. The 12-month probability imputed from
the elicited 3-month job-finding probability is computed as 1− (1−Z3)4,
where Z3 is the elicited 3-month job-finding probability. The 1-month
probability imputed from the elicited remaining duration is computed as
1− (1− 1
wks
)4, where wks is the elicited remaining duration unemployed.
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Figure D4: Ratio of Imputed Probabilities and Elicited Probabilities based on Alternative Forms of
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Imputed 1−Month Probability/Elicited 1−Month Probability
Notes: Survey weights are used and the samples are restricted to un-
employed workers, ages 20-65. The 12-month probability imputed from
the elicited 3-month job-finding probability is computed as 1− (1−Z3)4,
where Z3 is the elicited 3-month job-finding probability. The 1-month
probability imputed from the elicited remaining duration is computed as
1− (1− 1
wks
)4, where wks is the elicited remaining duration unemployed.
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D.2 Job Finding Beliefs and Outcomes
In this section, we provide additional details on the analysis of the predictive value of beliefs, a series of
robustness checks of the findings in Table 2 in the paper as well as the results for the KM survey. The
section also shows additional estimates of the non-parametric lower bounds in the SCE as well as the
lower bound estimates for the KM survey.
Table D1: Regressions of Realized 3-Month Job Finding on Elicitations (Showing Controls)
Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable for Job Finding (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability 0.586*** 0.464*** 0.501***
(0.073) (0.069) (0.092)
Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability -0.258*
x Long-Term Unemployed (0.142)
Long-Term Unemployed -0.078
(0.094)
Female -0.134** -0.114** -0.071
(0.055) (0.050) (0.046)
Age 0.017 0.018 0.019
(0.017) (0.015) (0.013)
Age*Age -0.0003 -0.0003* -0.0003*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
High-School Degree 0.216* 0.142 0.111
(0.130) (0.124) (0.101)
Some College 0.136 0.098 0.075
(0.121) (0.120) (0.095)
College Degree 0.117 0.054 0.031
(0.121) (0.119) (0.096)
Post-Graduate Education 0.139 0.059 0.034
(0.128) (0.126) (0.105)
Other Education 0.487* 0.388 0.329*
(0.267) (0.261) (0.197)
HH income: $30,000-$59,999 0.127** 0.111** 0.095**
(0.055) (0.053) (0.048)
HH income: $60,000-$100,000 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.150**
(0.058) (0.057) (0.060)
HH income: $100,000+ 0.151* 0.156** 0.113
(0.079) (0.072) (0.082)
Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic -0.022 -0.049 -0.062
(0.073) (0.067) (0.063)
Race/Ethnicity: African-American 0.157** 0.087 0.088
(0.078) (0.078) (0.070)
Race/Ethnicity: Asian 0.081 0.137 0.157*
(0.100) (0.084) (0.092)
Race/Ethnicity: Other -0.145* -0.131* -0.125**
(0.076) (0.073) (0.060)
Constant 0.121*** 0.171 -0.104 -0.062
(0.040) (0.402) (0.363) (0.329)
Observations 1,201 1,201 1,201 1,201
R2 0.131 0.148 0.218 0.259
Notes: The table shows the results in Table 2 in the paper with controls. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D3: Linear Regressions of Realized Job Finding on Elicitations (KM Survey)
Panel A. Elicited 1-Month Job-Finding Probability
Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable
for Realized 1-Month Job Finding (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elicited 1-Month Job-Finding Probability 0.260** 0.266*** 0.382***
(0.109) (0.094) (0.131)
Elicited 1-Month Job-Finding Probability -0.283




Observations 650 650 650 650
R2 0.039 0.189 0.224 0.234
Panel B. Elicited Expected Remaining Duration (Inverted)
Dependent Variable: Indicator Variable
for Realized 1-Month Job Finding (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elicited Remaining Duration (Inverted) 0.402 0.294 0.513
(0.178)** (0.090)*** (0.140)***
Elicited Remaining Duration (Inverted) -0.493




Observations 650 650 650 650
R2 0.080 0.189 0.223 0.249
Notes: Survey weights are used in all regressions. All samples are restricted to unemployed workers in
the KM survey, ages 20-65, with 4 consecutive weekly interviews following the belief question. For the
purpose of comparability across the columns in the table, the samples are restricted to the same number
of observations, i.e., where all control variables and both elicitations are observed. The elicited expected
remaining duration of unemployment (in weeks) is inverted to make it comparable to a 1-month job-finding
probability, computed as 1 − (1 − 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited expected remaining duration. Controls are
dummies for gender, race, ethnicity, household income brackets (4), educational attainment (6), and age
and age squared. Long-term unemployment is defined as a duration of unemployment of 60 weeks or more
at the beginning of the survey. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual level) are in parentheses.
Asteriks indicate statistical significance at the *0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 level.
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Elicited Remaining Duration (Inverted)
Average of Realized 1−Month Job−Finding Rate
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Survey weights are used and the sample is restricted to unemployed workers in the KM
survey, ages 20-65, with 4 consecutive weekly interviews following the belief question. The figures
show averages of the realized 1-month job-finding rate for five bins of elicited 1-month job-finding
probabilities (0-0.1, 0.1-0.2, 0.2-0.4, 0.4-0.6, 0.6-1). For the purpose of comparability across the
columns in the table, the samples are restricted to the same number of observations, i.e., where all
control variables and both elicitations are observed. The elicited expected remaining duration of
unemployment (in weeks) is inverted to make it comparable to a 1-month job-finding probability,
computed as 1− (1− 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited expected remaining duration.
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Table D4: Lower Bounds: Additional Estimates (SCE)
Residualized Short-term
Full sample (full sample) unemployed
Lower-bound measure based on Value S.e. Value S.e. Value S.e.
... 3-month elicitations 0.032 (0.009) 0.016 (0.005) 0.031 (0.012)
... 12-month elicitations 0.028 (0.008) 0.013 (0.004) 0.016 (0.009)
... both elicitations 0.038 (0.010) 0.019 (0.006) 0.029 (0.013)
... controls 0.036 (0.009) 0.020 (0.006) 0.043 (0.012)
... controls and 3-month elicitations 0.053 (0.010) 0.030 (0.007) 0.059 (0.014)
... controls and both elicitations 0.054 (0.010) 0.031 (0.007) 0.060 (0.014)
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications. The lower bounds based on 3- and/or
12-month elicitations are computed according to equations (3) and (4), respectively. The lower bounds based
on controls (and elicitations) are the variance of the predicted value of a linear regression of a dummy for
realized job finding on controls (and the elicited 3- and/or 12-month job-finding probability). For the results
in the second column, in a first stage, beliefs (in rows 1 to 3) and the predicted values (in rows 4 to 6) are
regressed on three dummies for unemployment duration (4-6 months, 7-12 months and 13+ months) and
then, in a second stage, the residual of the regression is used to compute the lower bounds. The sample in
the third column includes only those unemployed with a duration of 3 months or less.
Table D5: Lower Bounds Based on KM Survey
Lower bound measure based on: Value S.e.
... 1-month elicitations 0.0039 (0.0035)
... elicited remaining duration (inverted) 0.0081 (0.0086)
... both elicitations 0.0085 (0.0076)
... controls 0.0192 (0.0137)
... controls and both elicitations 0.0233 (0.0143)
Notes: The lower bounds based on elicitations are computed according
to equations (3) and (4). The lower bounds based on controls (and elici-
tations) are the variance of the predicted value of a linear regression of a
dummy for realized job finding on controls (and the elicited 1-month prob-
abilities). The elicited expected remaining duration of unemployment (in
weeks) is inverted to make it comparable to a 1-month job-finding proba-
bility, computed as 1− (1− 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited expected remaining
duration. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 2,000 replications.
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D.3 Biases in Beliefs
D.3.1 Average Bias by Duration
The following table shows the statistics in the SCE underlying the Figure 3 in the paper. It also shows
the corresponding statistics in the KM survey.
Table D6: Comparison of Perceived and Realized Job Finding
Elicited Job- Realized Job-
Finding Probability Finding Rate Sample Size
Panel A. SCE (3-month horizon)
Full Sample 0.491 (0.014) 0.408 (0.022) 1,201
Duration 0-3 months 0.616 (0.028) 0.642 (0.037) 369
Duration 4-6 months 0.529 (0.031) 0.472 (0.050) 184
Duration 7-12 months 0.530 (0.024) 0.333 (0.045) 198
Duration 13+ months 0.354 (0.015) 0.221 (0.027) 450
Panel B. KM Survey (1-month horizon)
Full sample 0.256 (0.019) 0.105 (0.022) 734
Duration 0-6 months 0.256 (0.042) 0.135 (0.043) 79
Duration 7-12 months 0.283 (0.031) 0.116 (0.048) 158
Duration 13+ months 0.232 (0.028) 0.076 (0.022) 497
Notes: Survey weights are used for all statistics. All samples are restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65. The
KM sample is further restricted to interviews where the belief questions were administered. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Duration refers to self-reported duration in the SCE and duration of weeks of benefit receipt in the KM
survey. The SCE sample for this table is restricted to individuals with 4 consecutive interviews. Actual job finding is
measured in the SCE as the fraction of individuals who reported being employed in month t+1, t+2 or t+3, where t is
the month of the interview where the belief was reported. The KM sample is restricted to those who have not accepted
a job in the same or any previous interviews and are not working at the time of the interview. Actual job finding in
the KM survey is measured as the fraction accepting a job offer or working in an interview at any point in the 31 days
following the interview where the belief was reported.
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D.3.2 Job Finding Beliefs by Duration: Robustness
In this section, we provide additional details on the robustness analysis of our longitudinal results in
Table 4 and Figure 4 in the main paper.
We probe the robustness of the finding that beliefs are not revised downward in several ways and
also evaluate potential forces that may underlie the (weakly) increasing beliefs about job-finding proba-
bilities. First, we check whether the results in column 4 of Table 4 hold for other measures of perceived
job finding. In the KM survey, we find that the expected remaining duration decreases with duration of
unemployment when controlling for individual fixed effect. This is obviously consistent with an increas-
ing probability over the spell of unemployment as reported in Table 4. For the purpose of comparison
with the probability question, we take the inverse of the expected duration question and convert it into
a 4-week probability, assuming that the probability is constant over the spell of unemployment (see
footnote 11 for details). Table D8 reports these results. We find that the coefficient is 0.013, which is
close to the estimate based on the probability question (0.022). Using the 12-month probabilities in the
SCE, the coefficient on unemployment duration is negative but insignificant and very close to zero with
an estimate of −0.0027 (0.0065). The point estimate implies that the 12-month probability decreases
by 3.2 percentage points over a 12-month period, which is almost trivial.
The first columns in Tables D7 and D8 report results where we exclude answers of 50 percent, results
where we exclude answers of 100 percent, results where we do not trim outlier answers as discussed
further above, and results where we use self-reported duration of unemployment as the independent vari-
able. While individuals increase their perceived job-finding probability as they approach re-employment,
the result remains if we exclude individuals who find and accept a job within the next 4 weeks in the
KM survey. Neither is the estimate affected when we exclude individuals who reported a job offer in
a previous interview but did not accept it (see Table D8). Across all these different specifications, the
results are very similar.
We also find that our results are robust to controlling for changes in aggregate labor market con-
ditions during our sample period. For the SCE, which uses a rotating panel, controlling for changes in
the national, state unemployment rates or quarterly GDP growth has little effect on our estimate of the
duration dependence in perceived job-finding probabilities. More importantly, we also run a specifica-
tion with individual fixed effects and fixed effects for calendar time, and find that the results are not
affected. Even though calendar time and duration are collinear in a given spell, this model is identified
in the presence of multiple unemployment spells per person. The results are very similar to our baseline
specification, demonstrating that aggregate time trends are unlikely to drive our longitudinal results on
perceived job finding. Note that, for the KM survey, the sample period coincides for all job seekers, so
calendar time and time spent unemployed are collinear and thus it is problematic to include the state
or local unemployment rate into the fixed effect regression. As discussed in Krueger and Mueller [2011],
however, the unemployment rate in NJ was nearly constant over the period of the survey (October 2009
through April 2010) between 9.5 and 9.8 and did not drop below 9.4 until August 2011, so it seems
unlikely that people perceived the job market to improve over the sample period.
Finally, one may be concerned that the beliefs are not elicited for individuals who get discouraged
and drop out of the labor and that as a consequence our longitudinal estimates are upward biased.
19
While this is a potential concern in the SCE where individuals were asked the belief questions only
when unemployed, we’d like to start by emphasizing that this is not the case for the KM survey, where
individuals were followed and their perceptions were elicited independently of whether they indicated
searching for a job or not. To further assess this issue in the SCE, we split the sample into those
unemployment spells that were interrupted by or ended with a transition into out of the labor force.
We find a negligent longitudinal decline for those spells with a UN transition of 0.0022 percentage points
per month (or 2.6 percentage points per year). We further assess this issue by imputing the longitudinal
decline for the months where the individual was reported to be out of the labor force based on the
longitudinal decline in the months unemployed. We then re-estimate our regression with spell fixed
effects but now including those survey months where a person was reported out of the labor force as
part of the same spell. As the last column in Panel B of Table D7 shows, the resulting coefficient on
unemployment duration remains positive and becomes even significant, suggesting that even for the
SCE, our longitudinal results are not biased upward. Note that the nature of this exercise is somewhat
different from the one further above, as the imputation procedure implies that we give more weight to
individuals with more or longer transitions into out of the labor force.
The lack of updating over the spell seems pervasive across different groups of job seekers. When
we regress the gradient of perceptions over the spell of unemployment, we find few characteristics that
correlate significantly with it. For example, in the KM survey, measures of impatience, risk aversion or
available savings do not correlate with the beliefs gradient.1 We find a positive within-person correlation
between liquidity constraints and the perceived probability - a job seeker reports a higher job-finding
probability when liquidity constraints become binding - but controlling for liquidity constraints does
not attenuate the positive impact of duration on beliefs.
To conclude, we have done extensive robustness checks and find that our results of the lack of
negative updating of beliefs over the unemployment spell is a very robust result in both the SCE and
the KM survey.
1Impatience in the KM survey is measured by the choice of a $20 incentive payment at the beginning of the survey over
the option of a $40 incentive payment after the first 12 weeks of the survey. Risk aversion is elicited as the willingness to
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure D6: Elicitations about Job Finding by Time since First Interview
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Notes: Survey weights are used for the averages shown in the figures, and the samples are restricted to unemployed
workers, ages 20-65. The figures show the elicited job-finding probabilities by months since the first interview, in
which a belief question was administered, for the SCE (Panel A) and the KM survey (Panel B). The left-hand side
figures show the raw averages of the elicited job-finding probabilities, whereas the right-hand side figures remove
individual fixed effects from the elicited job-finding probabilities. The elicited expected remaining duration of
unemployment (in weeks) is inverted to make it comparable to a 1-month job-finding probability, computed as
1− (1− 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited expected remaining duration. The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure D7: Average of Elicited Job-Finding Probabilities, by Duration of Unemployment and by Cohort
(KM Survey)
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Notes: Survey weights are used for the averages shown in the figures, and the samples are restricted to unemployed
workers in the KM survey, ages 20-65. The figure shows averages for each month of unemployment duration and
by cohort. The figures in Panel A show raw averages, whereas the figures in Panel B show averages after removing
individual fixed effects and adding the average for each cohort. The figures does not show averages for month-cohort
bins with less than 10 observations. The elicited expected remaining duration of unemployment (in weeks) is inverted
to make it comparable to a 1-month job-finding probability, computed as 1−(1− 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited expected
remaining duration. The bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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D.3.3 Further Evidence on Elicited Beliefs
In this section, we provide some evidence on the relationship between eliced beliefs and job search
behavior as reported in the KM survey. We also report some evidence on how job-seekers’ beliefs
respond to aggregate indicators of labor market tightness in the SCE.
Table D9 reports the results of regressions on reported search behavior in the KM data. We find
that across job seekers, the self-reported reservation wage bears a negative association with the 1-month
probability though statistically insignificant, whereas time spent on job search activities is a positive
predictor of the elicited 1-month probability (significant at the 1 percent level). Overall, these results are,
at least qualitatively, in line with what one could expect from a simple search model with a reservation
wage choice and endogenous search effort: the reservation wage has a negative effect on the probability
of accepting and thus finding a job, whereas search effort increases the probability of finding a job. The
causality, however, may well run in the opposite direction. Job seekers who update positively on the
probability of receiving a job offer are likely to increase their reservation wage. Indeed, we find some
evidence for this in column 4: controlling for individual fixed effects, job seekers who decrease their
reservation wage, reduce at the same time their expected remaining duration, though for the 1-month
probability question the relationship remains small and insignificant. Reverse causality may confound
the relationship between job finding beliefs and search effort as well. Controlling for individual fixed
effects, the correlation between perceived job finding and search disappears.
When deciding how hard to search, the perceived returns to search are key as well (Spinnewijn
[2015]). The survey gauges job seekers’ perceived control by asking whether they could increase their
job finding chances by spending more time searching for a job. Interestingly, the vast majority of job
seekers state that they cannot. Table D9 shows, controlling for search effort, that workers who report
a positive return to search at the margin also report higher job-finding probabilities.
We revisit the question on the role of beliefs for job search in our structural analysis in Section
5, where we specify a search model allowing for heterogeneous beliefs about the primitives of the job
search environment and calibrate this model targeting the true and perceived job finding in our data.
Note that our analysis in the statistical model in Section 4 abstracts from job search decisions and does
not rely on any assumption about how beliefs affect job search either.
Table D10 shows workers’ perceptions respond to aggregate indicators of job finding in the SCE.
We find that for unemployed individuals there is no significant relationship between the national or
state-level unemployment rate and the 3-month perception, though standard errors are relatively large.
We do find, however, a highly significant positive correlation with the elicited probability that the
stock market will rise and a highly significant negative correlation with the elicited probability that
the unemployment rate will rise. This suggests that unemployed job seekers take into account their
perceptions about aggregate conditions when expressing their perceptions about individual job finding
(or vice versa), but their perceptions about aggregate conditions seem ill-informed. These results thus
seem to suggest that unemployed workers’ perceptions under-react to aggregate indicators of their
employment prospects.
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Table D9: Linear Regressions of Elicitations on Time Spent on Job Search and the Reservation
Wage (KM Survey)
Dependent variable: Elicited 1-Month Elicited Remaining
Job-Finding Probability Duration (Inverted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for Control Belief 0.0884*** -0.0109 0.1053*** 0.0533*
(0.0253) (0.0230) (0.0197) (0.0307)
Time Spent on Job Search (Hours per Week) 0.0013** -0.0014 0.0011* 0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0014)
Log(Hourly Reservation Wage) -0.0304 -0.0109 -0.0477 0.1346*
(0.0346) (0.0758) (0.0298) (0.0812)
Reservation Commuting Distance, in Minutes -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0008* -0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0013)
Controls x x
Individual F.E. x x
Observations 3,967 4,059 3,905 3,984
R2 0.151 0.916 0.132 0.893
Notes: Survey weights are used in all regressions. All samples are restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65, in
the KM survey. Expected remaining duration (inverted) is calculated as 1− (1− 1
x
)4, where x is the elicited expected
remaining duration of unemployment (in weeks). The dummy for control belief is set to one for respondents who
believe that chances of finding a job increase if they spent more time searching. Robust standard errors (clustered at
the individual level) are in parentheses. Asteriks indicate statistical significance at the *0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 level.
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Table D10: Linear Regressions of Macroeconomic Measures on Elicitations (SCE)
Dependent Variable: Elicited
3-Month Job-Finding Probability (1) (2) (3) (4)
National Unemployment Rate 0.812
(1.369)
National Job Openings Rate 2.597
(2.460)
State Unemployment Rate -0.236 -0.561
(0.832) (0.763)
Elicited Prob(Rise in US Unemployment) 0.165***
(0.039)
Elicited Prob(Rise in Stock Prices) -0.079*
(0.042)
Demographics x x x x
State FE x x
Observations 2,593 2,593 2,593 2,569
R2 0.103 0.102 0.175 0.187
Notes: Survey weights are used in all regressions. All samples are restricted to unemployed workers
in the SCE, ages 20-65. Robust standard errors (clustered at the individual level) are in parentheses.
Asteriks indicate statistical significance at the *0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 level.
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E Statistical Framework
E.1 Additional Details on Setup of Model, Distributional Assumptions and Func-
tional Forms
We propose to parametrize our model relatively parsimoniously. Baseline job-finding rates, Ti, follow
the Beta distribution with shape parameters α and β. The Beta distribution is defined over the interval
[0, 1] and is quite flexible in terms of its shape. Note that for our exercise here it is important that
there is a continuum of job-finding probabilities or at least a large number. Assuming two types for
the job-finding probabilities and estimating their relative mass is not an attractive option, because our
observed elicitations are reported on the interval between 0 and 1. A model with only two underlying
job-finding rates thus would not perform well in matching the distribution of these elicitations.
The transitory component of the job-finding rate, τi,d, follows a uniform distribution subject to the
bounds [−Ti, 1(1−θ)d−Ti], and with masspoint(s) at the bounds of this interval such that E(τi,d|Ti) = 0 for
all Ti. More precisely, τ |Ti follows a uniform distribution on the interval [max(−στ ,−Ti),min(στ , 1(1−θ)d−
Ti)], with a masspoint at the bound of this interval if a bound is binding, such that E(τi,d|Ti) = 0 for
all Ti.
Random error in perceptions or elicitations, εi,d, follows a uniform distribution on the interval
[−σε, σε] subject to the bounds [−b0 − b1T̂ 3i,d, 1 − b0 − b1T 3i,d], and with masspoint(s) at the bounds of
this interval such that E(εi,d|T 3i,d) = 0 for all T 3i,d. More precisely, ε|T̂ 3i,d follows a uniform distribution
on the interval [max(−σε,−b0 − b1T 3i,d),min(σε, 1− b0 − b1T 3i,d)], with a masspoint at the bound of this
interval if a bound is binding, such that E(εi,d|T 3i,d) = 0 for all T 3i,d.
We assume that the maximum duration for each job seeker is two years, but we relax this assumptions
in a set of robustness checks, where we allow for a maximum duration of up to five years.
As discussed before, the identification of heterogeneity does not rely on particular distribution
functions for Ti, τi,d and εi,d, and we test the sensitivity of our results to alternative distributional
assumptions. Finally, job-finding rates depreciate at a geometric rate over the unemployment spell in
our baseline specification, with θd = (1 − θ)d. In an alternative specification, we assume a piece-wise
linear specification for the depreciation where θd = 1− dθ if d ≤ 12 and θd = 1− 12θ otherwise.
E.2 Model Fit and Estimation Results for Restricted Models
In this section, we provide additional details regarding the estimation of the statistical model in the
paper. Table E1 shows details on the model fit for the baseline model. Table E2 shows additional details
on the restricted versions of the model discussed in the paper and shown in Table 6.
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Table E1: Matched Moments
Value in
Moment Symbol Data Model
Average of Realized 3-Month Job-Finding Rates:
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment mF03 0.642 0.646
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment mF46 0.472 0.456
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More mF7+ 0.256 0.262
Average of Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability (Deviation from Realized):
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment mZ03 −mF03 −0.026 −0.027
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment mZ46 −mF46 0.057 0.058
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More mZ7+ −mF7+ 0.153 0.147
Average of Monthly Innovations in Elicitations mdZ 0.008 0.006
Variance of 3-Month Elicitations s2Z 0.093 0.093
Covariance of 3-Month Elicitations and Job Finding cZ,F 0.054 0.056
Covariance of 3-Month Elicitations and Job Finding in 3 Months cZd,Fd+3 0.025 0.024
Notes: Survey weights are used for all data moments, which are based on the SCE. The sample is restricted to un-
employed workers, ages 20-65, and includes only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly interviews.
The monthly innovations in elicitations refers to monthly individual-level changes in the elicited 3-month job-finding
probability.
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Table E2: Parameter Estimates and Model Fit for Restricted Versions of the Model
Panel A. Parameter Estimates and Selected Moments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline θ = 0 No heterog. στ = 0 b1 = 1 b0 = 0
in Ti,d b1 = 1
E(Ti) 0.403 0.405 0.318 0.419 0.294 0.332
V ar(Ti) 0.044 0.051 0.000 0.070 0.019 0.019
στ 0.334 -0.275 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.245
θ 0.017 0.000 0.106 -0.044 0.012 0.015
b0 0.265 0.269 0.341 0.27 0.065 0.000
b1 0.55 0.538 0.349 0.543 1.000 1.000
σε 0.453 0.453 0.442 0.454 0.374 0.38
V ar0(T
3
i,0) 0.076 0.079 0.000 0.085 0.051 0.047
V ar0(T
3
i ) 0.057 0.065 0.000 0.085 0.040 0.033
V ar0(Z
3
i,0) 0.081 0.082 0.066 0.083 0.087 0.085
TD 0.459 0.454 0.430 0.452 0.301 0.315
LD 0.070 0.000 0.430 -0.116 0.054 0.071
1− LD/TD (in %) 84.71 100.00 0.000 125.67 82.20 77.53
Panel B. Model Fit
Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Targeted Moments:
mF03 0.642 0.646 0.640 0.598 0.63 0.571 0.627
mF46 0.472 0.456 0.446 0.460 0.418 0.464 0.520
mF7+ 0.256 0.262 0.263 0.218 0.262 0.321 0.373
mZ03 −mF03 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.049 -0.018 0.064 0.000
mZ46 −mF46 0.057 0.058 0.062 0.041 0.078 0.066 -0.001
mZ7+ −mF7+ 0.153 0.147 0.148 0.199 0.151 0.066 0.00
mdZ 0.008 0.006 0.007 -0.013 0.006 0.004 0.006
s2Z 0.093 0.093 0.092 0.069 0.092 0.098 0.099
cZ,F 0.054 0.056 0.056 0.012 0.054 0.059 0.058
cZd,Fd+3 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.010 0.029 0.034 0.034
Weighted SSR 0.470 0.695 49.198 2.514 12.251 21.613
Notes: The table shows the estimation results for restricted versions of the baseline model, where Panel A
provides the parameter estimates and selected moments capturing the heterogeneity in true and perceived
job finding and the decline in true job finding over the first 12 months of the unemployment spell and Panel
B shows the model fit. The total decline (TD) is the difference in the average of the true 3-month job-finding
probability between job seekers at beginning of the unemployment spell and those still unemployed after
12 months, E0(T
3
i,0) − E12(T 3i,12). The longitudinal decline (LD) is the individual-level decline in the true
3-month job-finding probability over the first 12 months of the unemployment spell, averaged across all job
seekers, E0(T
3
i,0 − T 3i,12). 1− LDTD is the share of the total decline that the model attributes to heterogeneity
in true job-finding probabilities and the resulting process of dynamic selection.
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E.3 Robustness
In this section, we study the robustness of our results when using alternative specifications, alternative
moments, and alternative functional forms and distributions. Tables E3 and E4 show results for various
robustness checks discussed briefly in the paper.
First, we assess the estimated heterogeneity in our statistical model using the heterogeneity that
is not predictable using observable characteristics. The robustness check we perform is to estimate
the model on a set of residualized moments, i.e., the moments obtained from the residuals of a set of
linear regressions of the 3-month belief question and of the 3-month job-finding rate on the same set of
demographic controls as in Table 2. The estimation results are shown in Table E4 and the moments
in Table E5 . Overall, the estimation results are very similar to the baseline, with the role played by
true duration dependence being again close to zero. Of course, the extent of ex-ante heterogeneity is
estimated to be smaller in this robustness check, as the effects of observables are parsed out from all
moments. We also obtain a comparable estimate for the slope coefficient b1 of 0.559, which suggests that
the relationship between observed heterogeneity in job finding and beliefs is similar as the relationship
between unobserved heterogeneity in job finding and beliefs.
Second, we probe the robustness of our findings to alternative assumptions about the functional
form and distributions as well as extensions of the model, as reported in Tables E3 and E4. Without
discussing these estimates in detail, the table shows that the parameter estimates are very stable across
all of the results reported in the table. In particular, our results are robust to assuming that Ti follows
the Gamma distribution (2), and to assuming that ε follows a bounded normal distribution, which
no longer satisfies mean-independence of the error term (3). Our results are also robust to assuming
piecewise linear true duration dependence instead of geometric depreciation (4), extending the horizon
of the model to 5 years (5), and doing both (6). We also extend the model to allow for completely
persistent elicitation errors (i.e., εi,d = εi) and find that it has no impact on our estimation results
(7). This is also true when we extend the model to allow for bunching at 0, 0.5 and 1 of the elicited
beliefs, by imposing on the baseline model that any belief in the intervals (0, 0.1], [0.4, 0.6] resp. [0.9, 1)
are reset to the bunching points 0, 0.5 resp. 1. Despite these relatively strong assumptions about the
nature of bunching, the results of the estimation appear not to be affected (8). This suggests that the
variations in elicitations across (rather than within) these intervals is the dominant source of variation
that is relevant for identification of the key parameters in the model. We also report the results for a
model (9), where a share α of individuals has random elicitations (Z3i,d = b0 + ε) and a share 1 − α
correctly perceives their job finding prospects (Z3i,d = T
3
i,d). The model results are very similar to our
baseline, and the value of 1−α is close to the value of b1, suggesting that b1 in our baseline may instead
capture the share of individuals who perceive their job finding prospects correctly. Our results are also
very similar when using the residualized data moments as discussed before (10), or when excluding
individuals with recall expectations when generating the data moments (11). Furthermore, the results
do not change either when restricting the set of moments by using only 0-6 and 7+ months for the time
intervals and dropping the mean of monthly innovations, so that the model is exactly identified (12),
or when using the inverse of the bootstrapped variances on the diagonal of the weighting matrix (and
zero otherwise) instead of the full variance-covariance matrix as the weighting matrix (13).
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Finally, in (14) we show the results for the extended model, where θ̂ 6= θ, as discussed in detail
in the paper. The targeted moments and the model fit are reported in Table E6. Figures E1 and E2
show the estimated duration dependence in true and perceived job finding for both the baseline model
and the extended model. Overall, the duration dependence in both true job finding and the bias looks
very similar across the two models. For this reason, not surprisingly, the fit of the restricted model in
column 15 of Table E4 where θ̂ = θ is close to the fit of the unrestricted version of the extended model
in column 14.
To summarize, we find that our results for the baseline model are very robust to alternative as-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E5: Matched Moments (Residualized)
Value in
Moment Symbol Data Model
Average of Realized 3-Month Job-Finding Rates:
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment mF03 0.642 0.641
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment mF46 0.513 0.525
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More mF7+ 0.369 0.373
Average of Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability (Deviation from Realized):
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment mZ03 −mF03 −0.026 −0.025
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment mZ46 −mF46 0.042 0.026
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More mZ7+ −mF7+ 0.098 0.094
Average of Monthly Innovations in Elicitations mdZ 0.009 0.006
Variance of 3-Month Elicitations s2Z 0.078 0.078
Covariance of 3-Month Elicitations and Job Finding cZ,F 0.036 0.038
Covariance of 3-Month Elicitations and Job Finding in 3 Months cZd,Fd+3 0.020 0.020
Notes: Survey weights are used for all data moments, which are based on the SCE. The sample is restricted to unemployed
workers, ages 20-65, and includes only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly interviews. Moments
are computed based on residuals from a regression on dummies for gender, race, ethnicity, household income, educational
attainment, and age and age squared. Note that the raw mean of the variables in the full sample is added to the residual.
The monthly innovations in elicitations refers to monthly individual-level changes in the elicited 3-month job-finding
probability.
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Table E6: Matched Moments (Extended Model)
Value in
Moment Symbol Data Model
Average of Realized 3-Month Job-Finding Rates:
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment mF03 0.642 0.656
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment mF46 0.472 0.452
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More mF7+ 0.256 0.250
Average of Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability (Deviation from Realized):
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment mZ03 −mF03 −0.026 −0.030
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment mZ46 −mF46 0.057 0.060
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More mZ7+ −mF7+ 0.153 0.153
Average of Monthly Innovations in Elicitations mdZ 0.008 0.009
Variance of 3-Month Elicitations:
... at 0-6 Months of Unemployment s2Z06 0.098 0.091
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More s2Z7+ 0.073 0.079
Covariance of 3-Month Elicitations and Job Finding:
... at 0-6 Months of Unemployment cZ06,F06 0.056 0.055
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or More cZ7+,F7+ 0.025 0.029
Covariance of 3-Month Elicitations and Job Finding in 3 Months cZd,Fd+3 0.025 0.021
Notes: Survey weights are used for all data moments, which are based on the SCE. The sample is restricted to un-
employed workers, ages 20-65, and includes only interviews that were followed by three consecutive monthly interviews.
The monthly innovations in elicitations refers to monthly individual-level changes in the elicited 3-month job-finding
probability.
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Figure E1: Duration Dependence in Job Finding in Baseline and Extended Model
(a) Baseline Model
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(b) Extended Model
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Observed Duration Dependence in Job Finding
True Duration Dependence in Job Finding
Notes: The figure shows further estimation results of the baseline model (a) and the extended model (b). The observed
duration dependence in job finding shows the averages of the realized 3-month job-finding rate at duration d, averaged
across job seekers still unemployed after d months of unemployment, Ed(T
3
i,d). The true duration dependence in job
finding shows the realized 3-month job-finding rate at duration d, averaged across all job seekers, E0(T
3
i,d).
Figure E2: Duration Dependence in Biases in Perceptions in Baseline and Extended Model
(a) Baseline Model
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Observed Duration Dependence in Job Finding
True Duration Dependence in Job Finding
(b) Extended Model
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Observed Duration Dependence in Job Finding
True Duration Dependence in Job Finding
Notes: The figure shows further estimation results of the baseline model (a) and the extended model (b). The observed
duration dependence in bias shows the differences in the averages of the perceived and realized 3-month job-finding rate
at duration d, averaged across job seekers still unemployed after d months of unemployment, Ed(Z
3
i,d) − Ed(T 3i,d). The
true duration dependence in bias shows the differences in the averages of the perceived and realized 3-month job-finding





In this section, we provide further details on the identification of the parameters in the statistical model.
We proceed in two steps:
First, we prove that in a two-period version of the statistical model, where στ = 0, all other
parameters are a function of moments with an empirical counterpart in the data and thus are identified.
Second, we provide a formal identification argument in the two-period model where στ > 0, and
then show that in the full model a monotone relationship exists between στ and the moment cZd,Fd+3 ,
conditional on having identified all other parameters of the model.
Third, we extend the two-period model to allow for θ̂ 6= θ and prove that in the version of this
model, where στ = 0, all other parameters are a function of moments with an empirical counterpart in
the data and thus are identified. We then show in the full model that a monotonic relationship exists
between θ̂ and the moments cF7+,Z7+ and s
2
Z7+
, conditional on having identified all other parameters of
the model.
E.4.1 Identification in two-period model with στ = 0
Proposition 2. In a two-period version of the statistical model with measurement error, var(ε), that is
independent of Ti,d and with στ = 0, the parameters b0, b1, and θ as well as the mean and the variance
of the persistent component of job-finding rates, E(Ti) and var(Ti), and the variance of the elicitation
error, var(ε), are identified by the moment conditions for: (1) the means of the elicited job-finding
probabilities in period 1 and 2, mZ1 and mZ2, (2) the means of the realized job-finding rates in period
1 and 2, mF1 and mF2, (3) the covariance of realized job finding and elicited job-finding probabilities in




Proof. We start by assuming that there are only two periods, and that στ = 0. In this case, we can
write down the moment conditions for the moments mentioned in the proposition above as:
mZ1 = b0 + b1E1(Ti) (21)
mZ2 = b0 + b1(1− θ)E2(Ti) (22)
mF1 = E1(Ti) (23)
mF2 = (1− θ)E2(Ti) (24)
cF1,Z1 = cov1(Fi,1, b1Ti) (25)
s2Z1 = b
2
1var1(Ti) + var(ε) (26)
where sub-indices 1 and 2 on the moments stands for the sample of survivors. Note that E1(Ti) = E(Ti)
and var1(Ti) = var(Ti), i.e. the moments for the sample of survivors in period 1 correspond to the










Then, we can write:






= b1var1(Ti) = b1var(Ti) (29)
Hence, we can pin down the mean and the variance of Ti from moment conditions (23) and (29):



















Substituting this into the moment condition for mF2 , we get:




Rearranging and using equation (30), we get:







= 1− (mZ2 −mZ1)(mF2(1−mF1))
mF1(1−mF1)− (mF2 −mF1)cF1,Z1
(34)








Since var(ε) is increasing in σε, the equation implies a value for σε.
In conclusion, equations 27, 28, 30, 31, 34 and 35 solve parameters b0, b1, θ and moments E(Ti),
var(Ti) and var(ε) for any distribution of these variables as function of moments that we observe in
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the data (mZ1 , mZ2 , mF1 , mF2 , cF1,Z1 and s
2
Z1
). The two-period model with στ = 0 is thus identified.
Proposition 3. In a two-period version of the statistical model with both a measurement error, ε, that
is independent of Ti,d, as well as a non-classical measurement error of the form η = c0 +c1Ti,d, and with
στ = 0, the parameters b̃0 = b0, b̃1 = b1 +c1, and θ as well as the mean and the variance of the persistent
component of job-finding rates, E(Ti) and var(Ti), and the variance of the classical elicitation error,
var(ε), are identified by the moment conditions for: (1) the means of the elicited job-finding probabilities
in period 1 and 2, mZ1 and mZ2, (2) the means of the realized job-finding rates in period 1 and 2, mF1
and mF2, (3) the covariance of realized job finding and elicited job-finding probabilities in period 1,




Proof. As argued in the main text of the paper, the model continues to be identified exactly in the
presence of non-classical measurement error, as long as it is a linear in Ti. The proof is almost trivial,
as we can re-express equations 21, 22, 25 and 26 from above as:
mZ1 = (b0 + c0) + (b1 + c1)E1(Ti) (36)
mZ2 = (b0 + c0) + (b1 + c1)(1− θ)E2(Ti) (37)
cF1,Z1 = cov1(Fi, (b1 + c1)Ti) (38)
s2Z1 = (b1 + c1)
2var1(Ti) + var(ε) (39)
or:
mZ1 = b̃0 + b̃1E1(Ti) (40)
mZ2 = b̃0 + b̃1(1− θ)E2(Ti) (41)
cF1,Z1 = cov1(Fi, b̃1Ti) (42)
s2Z1 = (b̃1)
2var1(Ti) + var(ε) (43)
These moment conditions are identical to the ones in the model without non-classical measurement
error, except that we replaced b0 and b1 with b̃0 and b̃1. It follows from the proof for Proposition 2
that the parameters b̃0, b̃1, θ and moments E(Ti), var(Ti) and var(ε) are functions of moments that
we observe in the data (mZ1 , mZ2 , mF1 , mF2 , cF1,Z1 and s
2
Z1
). The two-period model with στ = 0 and
non-classical measurement error of the form η = c0 + c1Ti is thus identified.
E.4.2 Identification of στ
Our conjecture is that in a two-period version of the statistical model with measurement error, ε, that
is independent of Ti,d, with transitory shocks to job finding, τi,d, that are independent of Ti, and with
G(Ti) following a two-parameter distribution, the parameters b0, b1, θ, and στ as well as the mean and
the variance of the persistent component of job-finding rates, E(Ti) and var(Ti), and the variance of
the elicitation error, var(ε), are identified by the moment conditions for: (1) the means of the elicited
job-finding probabilities in period 1 and 2, mZ1 and mZ2 , (2) the means of the realized job-finding rates
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in period 1 and 2, mF1 and mF2 , (3) the covariance of realized job finding and the elicited job-finding
probabilities in period 1, cF1,Z1 , (4) the covariance of realized job finding in period 2 and the elicited
job-finding probabilities in period 1, cF2,Z1 , and (5) the variance of the elicited job-finding probabilities
in period 1, s2Z1 .
We again consider a model with only two periods, period 1 and 2. In this case, we can write down
the moment conditions for the moments mentioned in the proposition above as:
mZ1 = b0 + b1E1(Ti + τi,1) (44)
mZ2 = b0 + b1(1− θ)E2(Ti + τi,2) (45)
mF1 = E1(Ti + τi,1) (46)
mF2 = (1− θ)E2(Ti + τi,2) (47)
cF1,Z1 = cov1(Fi, b1(Ti + τi,1)) (48)
cF2,Z1 = cov2(Fi, b1(Ti + τi,1)) (49)
s2Z1 = b
2
1var1(Ti + τi,1) + var(ε) (50)









We can again re-write the expectation conditional on survival to period 2, now of Ti + τi,1, as:
E2(Ti + τi,1) =
E1
[
(Ti + τi,1)(1− Ti − τi,1)
]
1− E1(Ti + τi,1)
=
E1(Ti)− E1(T 2i )− E1(τ2i,1)
1− E1(Ti)
=
E1(Ti)(1− E1(Ti))− var1(Ti)− var1(τi,1)
1− E1(Ti)
(53)
because E1(τi,1) = E1(Tiτi,1) = 0. Similarly, we obtain





because E1(τi,1) = E1(Tiτi,2) = E1(Tiτi,1) = E1(τi,1τi,2) = 0. Hence, we can re-write:
cF1,Z1 = cov1(Fi,1, b1(Ti + τi,1))
= b1[E1(Fi,1(Ti + τi,1))− E1(Fi)E1(Ti + τi,1)]
= b1[E1(E1(Fi,1(Ti + τi,1)|Ti, τi,1))− E1(Ti + τi,1)E1(Ti + τi,1)]
= b1[E1(E1((Ti + τi,1)(Ti + τi,1)|Ti, τi,1))− E1(Ti + τi,1)E1(Ti + τi,1)]
= b1[E1((Ti + τi,1)
2)− E1(Ti + τi,1)E1(Ti + τi,1)]
= b1[E1((T
2





i ) + E1(τ
2
i,1)− E1(Ti)E1(Ti)]
= b1[var1(Ti) + var1(τi,1)] (55)
because E1(Tiτi,1) = 0. Similarly, we obtain:
cF2,Z1 = cov2(Fi,2, b1(Ti + τi,1))
= b1[E2(Fi,2(Ti + τi,1))− E2(Fi,2)E2(Ti + τi,1)]
= b1[E2(E2(Fi,2(Ti + τi,1)|Ti, τi,1))− (1− θ)E2(Ti + τi,2)E2(Ti + τi,1)]
= b1[E2((1− θ)(Ti + τi,2)(Ti + τi,1))− (1− θ)E2(Ti + τi,2)E2(Ti + τi,1)]

















where the last equality uses the same steps as before to re-write the conditional expectation. Re-





























































Using equation (55) to get var1(Ti) =
cF1,Z1
b1








cF1,Z1 + var1(τi,1)[ mF2−mF1
mZ2−mZ1










For two-parameter distributions of Ti where E1(T
3
i ) is either implicitly or explicitly defined by the
first two moments of the distribution, we can define a function h(., .), such that E1(T
3









cF1,Z1 + var1(τi,1)[ mF2−mF1
mZ2−mZ1












While it is not possible to solve explicitly for στ , we note that for h2 ≤ 0, the right-hand side of the
equation (56) above depends negatively on στ , and thus a solution for στ exists.
2 A solution also exists
for h2 ≤ h̃, where h̃ is some positive number, as long as h̃ is smaller than some upper bound h̄.
Having solved for var1(τi,1), when a solution to equation (56) exists, we can then find a solution for
the mean and variance of Ti:




cF1,Z1 − var1(τi,1) (58)
Rearranging and using equation (47), we also get:














In conclusion, if a solution exists to equation (56), implicitly defining στ , we can solve for parameters
b0, b1, σε, and θ as well as the mean and variance of the persistent component of job-finding rates,
E(Ti) = E1(Ti) and var(Ti) = var1(Ti), as a function of the moments mZ1 , mZ2 , mF1 , mF2 , cF1,Z1 ,
2Note στ is monotonically increasing in but not equal to var1(τi,1), because of the boundary conditions.
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Figure E3: The relationship between στ and the moment cZd,Fd+3 in the estimated sub-model




















, as shown in equations 51, 52, 57, 58, 59 and 60.
To provide further evidence on identification of the parameter στ , we now proceed by showing that
in the context of our estimated model (i.e., with more than two periods), there is a monotone mapping
between the parameter στ and the moment CZd,Fd+3 . More precisely, we estimate a sub-model of the
baseline version of our statistical model for different levels of στ , by targeting all of the same moments
except CZd,Fd+3 . Figure E3 shows that there is a monotone relationship between the level of στ and the
covariance of the elicited job-finding probabilities and the 3-month forward realized job-finding rates in
this estimated sub-model, which shows that our parameter στ is identified by the moment CZd,Fd+3 in
the full (baseline) model.
E.4.3 Identification in extended model with θ̂ 6= θ
Proposition 4. In a two-period version of the extended version of the statistical model with θ̂ 6= θ and
with measurement error, ε, that is independent of Ti,d, but with στ = 0, the parameters b0, b1, θ, θ̂ as
well as the mean and the variance of the persistent component of job-finding rates, E(Ti) and var(Ti),
and the variance of the elicitation error, var(ε), are identified by the moment conditions for: (1) the
means of the elicited job-finding probabilities in period 1 and 2, mZ1 and mZ2, (2) the means of the
realized job-finding rates in period 1 and 2, mF1 and mF2, (3) the covariance of realized job finding
and the elicited job-finding probabilities in period 1, cF1,Z1, (4) the variance of the elicited job-finding
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probabilities in period 1, s2Z1, and (5) a statistic that depends on all these moments as well as the
variance of the elicited job-finding probabilities in period 2, s2Z2, and the covariance with realized job
finding in period 2, cF2,Z2.
Proof. We assume that there are only two periods, and that στ = 0. In this case, we can write down
the moment conditions for the moments mentioned in the proposition above as:
mZ1 = b0 + b1E1(Ti) (61)
mZ2 = b0 + b1(1− θ̂)E2(Ti) (62)
mF1 = E1(Ti) (63)
mF2 = (1− θ)E2(Ti) (64)
cF1,Z1 = cov1(Fi,1, b1Ti) (65)
cF2,Z2 = cov2(Fi,2, b1Ti) (66)
s2Z1 = b
2
1var1(Ti) + var(ε) (67)
s2Z2 = b
2
1(1− θ̂)2var2(Ti) + var(ε) (68)
where sub-indices 1 and 2 on the moments stands for the sample of survivors. Note that E1(Ti) = E(Ti)
and var1(Ti) = var(Ti), i.e. the moments for the sample of survivors in period 1 correspond to the
population moments. One can express the additional moment condition (66) as follows:
cF2,Z2 = cov2(Fi,2, b1(1− θ̂)Ti)
= b1(1− θ̂)[E2(Fi,2Ti)− E2(Fi,2)E(Ti)]
= b1(1− θ̂)[E2(E2(Fi,2Ti|Ti))− (1− θ)E2(Ti)2]
= b1(1− θ̂)(1− θ)[E2(T 2i )− E2(Ti)2]
= b1(1− θ̂)(1− θ)var2(Ti)
Re-arranging the moment conditions 61-67 and using equations (29) and (32), we thus get:
mZ1 = b0 + b1mF1 (69)




mF1 = E1(Ti) (71)







cF1,Z1 = b1var1(Ti) (73)
cF2,Z2 = b1(1− θ̂)(1− θ)var2(Ti) (74)
s2Z1 = b
2
1var1(Ti) + var(ε) (75)
s2Z2 = b
2
1(1− θ̂)2var2(Ti) + var(ε) (76)
The mean of the job-finding rate, E(Ti) = E1(Ti), is directly identified by moment condition in equation
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(71).We then take the difference of the first two moment conditions:








which gives b1 as a function of moments, θ and θ̂. Next combine equations 73 and 75 and equations 74
and 76, to get:




cF2,Z2 + var(ε) (79)
and taking the difference, we get:
s2Z1 − s
2






















































Equation 84 defines the ratio of 1−θ̂1−θ as a function of moments only. Using the ratio, one can rearrange






Using b1, one can use equation 61 to get b0 as a function of moments only:
b0 = mZ1 − b1mF2 (86)





Using b1 and var(Ti), one can use equation 75 to get var(ε) as a function of moments only:
var(ε) = s2Z1 − b
2
1var(Ti) (88)





Using θ and equation 84, we get θ̂ as a function of moments only:










In conclusion, equations 85 (together with equation 84), 86, 63, 87, 88, 89 and 90 solve parameters
b0, b1, θ, θ̂ and population moments E(Ti), var(Ti) and var(ε) for any distribution of these variables
as function of moments that we observe in the data (mZ1 , mZ2 , mF1 , mF2 , cF1,Z1 , s
2
Z1
and the ratio in
equation 84). The two-period model with στ = 0 and θ̂ 6= θ is thus identified.
To provide evidence on the identification of the parameter θ̂ in the full version of the model that we
estimate with the data, we proceed by showing that in the context of our estimated model (i.e., with
more than two periods and στ > 0), there is a monotone mapping between θ̂ and the covariance in
duration interval 7+, cF7+,Z7+ as well as a monotone mapping between θ̂ and the variance of elicitations
in duration interval 7+, s2Z7+ . More precisely, we estimate a sub-model of the extended version of




. Figure E4 shows that there is a monotone relationship between the level of θ̂ and
the covariance of the elicited job-finding probabilities and realized job finding in duration interval 7+ as
well as a monotone relationship between level of θ̂ and the variance of elicitations in duration interval
7+. This shows that both of these moments provide variation that identifies the parameter θ̂ in the full
(extended) model.
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Figure E4: The relationship between θ̂ and moments cF7+,Z7+ and s
2
Z7+
in the estimated sub-model





































This section provides further details on the derivations and Proposition in the theoretical analysis and
the calibration and counterfactual analysis in the numerical analysis in Section 5.
F.1 Theoretical Analysis










[V (w)− U ]dF (w)]
}
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V (w) + λe
∫
w





where σ denotes the separation rate and λe the arrival rate of job offers when employed. For an
individual i, we have
Ti,d = λi[1− F (Ri)].
Now dropping subindices, we can consider the impact on the job-finding rate T of infinitesimal changes
in λ and λ̂,
dT = [1− F (R)]dλ− λf(R)dR
dλ̂
dλ̂,
A change in λ does not trigger a change in the reservation wage R since it is only the perceived arrival












To unpack the dR
dλ̂
term we consider the determination of the reservation wage. The reservation wage



























We can totally differentiate this condition with respect to R and λ̂, applying the envelope theorem to
the right hand side (i.e., dU/dR = 0) and assuming no job separation risk and no on-the-job search
































































This corresponds to equation (17) in the main text.
F.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we consider the introduction of heterogeneity. That is, we assume λj = λ̄+ dλj for j = h, l with
dλh = −dλl ≈ 0, but we keep θ = 0. We also assume an equal share of high and low types, φ = 1/2.
Now for small differences in actual and perceived arrival rates, we can approximate




















Ed (Ti) [1− Ed(Ti)]
.
Given the mean-preserving spread in the arrival rates, we have














= [1− F (R)]2
[























+ (1−B)φλhλl + (1−B1) (1− φ)λhλl − λ̄2




= [2B1 − 1] var0 (dλ) .
The last equality follows since var0 (dλ) = λ̄
2 − λhλl for φ = 1/2.
Hence,
var0(Ti) = [1− F (R)]2
[
1 + κ2 − 2κ [2B1 − 1]
]
var0 (dλ) .
Small changes in the dispersion leave the expected job-finding rate unaffected to a first-order, but do
increase the variance in job finding rates. However, the increase in the dispersion is scaled and has a
smaller impact on the variance in job-finding rates, the higher B1. The first part of the Proposition
immediately follows.
































































We now look at the reaction of the respective reservations wage to the depreciation parameter. The
51




















so substituting the former into the latter for Ud, Ud+1,and V (w) gives,
1 + δ
δ

























































∣∣∣∣w > Rd]+ u′(Rd+1)u′(Rd) (1− λ̂d)dRd+1dθ
}
,

























Starting from θ ≈ 0, the reservation wage, arrival rate, and job-finding rate are approximate constant
and the perceived arrival rate equals the actual arrival rate. Denoting by R and T = λ [1− F (R)] the
reservation wage and the job finding for the stationary type, where we have dropped the subindex 0 in















































which proves that the reservation wage responds more at longer durations. The last equality above
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follows from expanding the power series as follows:
∞∑
s=d+1
(1− λ)s−d−1s =d+ 1 + (1− λ)(d+ 2) + (1− λ)2(d+ 3) + (1− λ)3(d+ 4) + . . . ,



































































































































This proves the second part of the Proposition.
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F.2 Numerical Analysis
Table F1 shows the 8 moments that we target in the calibration of our structural model. As in the
statistical model, the targeted moments include the actual and perceived job-finding rates for the short,
medium and long-term unemployed. We additionally target an average job acceptance rate underlying
the job-finding rates of 0.71, as estimated by Hall and Mueller [2018] using the KM survey. As we
already estimated the true duration dependence in our statistical model using elicited beliefs moments,
instead of targeting these again, we directly target a moment capturing the true depreciation in job
finding, i.e., the average of the ratio of true job finding when long-term vs. short-term unemployed
within a spell (i.e., E7+(Ti,d)/E06(Ti,d) for a given spell). We simulate this moment using the baseline
estimation of our statistical model, obtaining a value of 0.895. We also gauge the robustness of our
results to the rate of depreciation and recalibrate the model targeting a ratio 0.75, which is below any
estimate we obtain in the statistical model (excluding the specification in which we do not allow for
heterogeneity). We set the perceived true duration dependence Bθ equal to 0 in both specifications.
Table F2 Panel A shows the set parameter values. We set the separation rate at 0.02 per month,
corresponding the average separation rate in the SCE. We set arrival rate of job offers for employed
workers at 0.15, in line with recent evidence in Faberman et al. [2017] also using the SCE. We assume that
wages are log-normally distributed, with a standard deviation of the logged distribution of σw = 0.24 as
estimated by Hall and Mueller [2018] with the KM survey data. We normalize the median of the wage
offer distribution to 1. We also assume an annual discount factor 0.996 and CRRA preferences with
relative risk aversion equal to 2. Panel B of Table F2 shows the remaining 7 parameters of our model
{B0, B1, λl, λh, φ, θ, bu} that are estimated by targeting the vector of 8 moments. We assume that the
flow utility when unemployed u(bu) remains constant throughout the spell. We also assume that the
arrival rates depreciate at geometric rate θ for the first 24 months of the spell, but then remain constant
so that the unemployment state becomes stationary. We assume that a worker who is separated after
an employment spell of less than six months starts the unemployment spell in this stationary state.
The estimated parameters minimize the sum of squared differences between data moments and
simulated moments from the model. We find that the uniform bias parameter B0 is negative, but the
average bias is still positive. This is due to the share of low types perceiving themselves as high, who
remain unemployed for the longest. The probability that high (low) types perceive themselves as high
(low) types equals B1 = 0.84 in the baseline specification. As we assume that none of the true duration
dependence in job finding is perceived (Bθ = 0), the corresponding cross-sectional bias becomes smaller
in the model where we target high true duration dependence (B1 = 0.89).
3
Table F1 shows that we closely match our targeted moments. We also obtain plausible values for
standard labor market statistics; the elasticity of the unemployment duration with respect to unemploy-
ment benefits is 0.62, which is within the range of estimates in the literature (see Schmieder and von
Wachter [2016]). The elasticity of the reservation wage equals 0.59, which corresponds to the estimate
in Fishe [1982]. The elasticity of the equilibrium wage equals .04, which is arguably low, but still higher
than recent estimates in Jaeger et al. [2020]. The monthly rate of job-to-job transitions equals 0.024,
3We have also extended our model with a type-specific bias in the perceived arrival rates. This relaxes the restrictions
of our stylized model that on average the low-type job seekers are more optimistic than the high-type job seekers. However,
the estimated type-specific biases are very close, suggesting that this restriction is not binding.
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which is within the range considered by Hornstein et al. [2011].4
Table F3 shows the impact of eliminating the biases in beliefs on the average unemployment durations
and the share of long-term unemployed. The intermediate columns consider the elimination of one bias
at a time, the last column the elimination of all biases simultaneously. From Panel A, which shows
the results for the baseline model, we see that eliminating all biases lowers the average unemployment
duration, but this effect is numerically very small. Despite the small impact on the overall duration, the
impact on the share of LT unemployed is substantial, which decreases by 8.1 percent (2.4 percentage
points) when all biases are eliminated. Panel B shows the results for the model calibrated with high
depreciation rate. The effect on the average unemployment duration is somewhat larger, at around 0.15
months. However, eliminating the biases reduces the share of LT unemployed by 2.6 percentage points,
which is slightly higher than in the baseline model. Overall, the model’s prediction that biased beliefs
contribute substantially to the high incidence of LT unemployment is robust to the relative importance
of heterogeneity vs. true depreciation in the arrival rates.5
4We also performed sensitivity checks when changing incidental parameters, including the dispersion of the wage
distribution, the level of risk aversion, the arrival rate of job offers for the employed workers and for the separated workers
after short employment spells, which all change the relative value of unemployment to employment. For the baseline model,
it is mainly the parameter bu affecting the flow value of unemployment that adjusts, while the other parameter estimates
remain very similar. The other parameter estimates become more sensitive in the model with high depreciation.
5We note that these counterfactual results remain very similar when changing incidental parameters (i.e., wage offer
distribution, arrival rates, risk aversion) in the baseline calibration, but are somewhat sensitive in the calibration with high
depreciation.
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Average of Realized 3-Month Job-Finding Rates:
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment 0.642 0.641 0.640
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment 0.472 0.470 0.474
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or more 0.256 0.259 0.255
Average of Elicited 3-Month Job-Finding Probability:
... at 0-3 Months of Unemployment 0.616 0.614 0.614
... at 4-6 Months of Unemployment 0.529 0.537 0.534
... at 7 Months of Unemployment or more 0.409 0.404 0.405
Acceptance Rate: 0.710 0.715 0.715
True Duration Dependence:
... Baseline Depreciation 0.895 0.895 -
... High Depreciation 0.75 - 0.750
Notes: Survey weights are used for all data moments from the SCE (averages of realized and elicited job finding.
The SCE sample is restricted to unemployed workers, ages 20-65, and includes only interviews that were followed
by three consecutive monthly interviews. The target for the acceptance rate is from Hall and Mueller [2018],
and the target for the true duration dependence in the baseline model is based on the estimates in the statistical
model. More precisely, we target the ratio of the sample average of job finding when long-term unemployed (> 6
months) vs. the sample average of job finding when short-term unemployed (≤ 6 months). This ratio is estimated
to be 0.90 in the statistical model. We gauge the sensitivity of our results to setting this target ratio at 0.75 in
the high-depreciation model, which is below any estimate from the statistical model.
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Panel A. Set Parameters
Median of wage offer distribution µw 1 1
Std. dev. of logged wage offer distribution σw 0.24 0.24
Exogeneous job loss probability σ 0.02 0.02
Arrival rate when employed λe 0.15 0.15
Discount rate δ 0.004 0.004
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 2 2
Longitudinal bias Bθ 0 0
Panel B. Estimated Parameters
Uniform bias B0 -0.014 -0.051
Cross-sectional bias B1 0.84 0.89
Low-type arrival rate λl 0.12 0.16
High-type arrival rate λh 0.63 0.67
Share of high-types φ 0.78 0.74
True depreciation in arrival rate θ 0.019 0.046
Unemployed consumption bu 0.52 0.52
Notes: The table shows the calibrated parameter values, where the parameters in Panel A are nor-
malizations or set based on external information and Panel B shows the estimated parameters that are
obtained from targeting the data moments in Table F1.








Panel A. Baseline Model
Unemployment duration 4.01 4.07 4.01 3.90 3.95
Share of LT unemployed 0.295 0.297 0.275 0.289 0.271
Panel B. High-Depreciation Model
Average unemployment duration 4.00 4.15 3.98 3.74 3.86
Share of LT unemployed 0.293 0.299 0.278 0.278 0.267
Notes: The table reports selected moments for the baseline calibration of the structural model (Panel
A), a calibration with a higher individual-level depreciation in true job-finding probabilities (Panel B)
and counterfactual simulations where the biases in the respective model are eliminated. Besides the
depreciation in job finding, both calibrations match the same set of moments (see Table F1), resulting
in the same average unemployment duration and share of long-term unemployed.
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Figure F1: Comparative Statics: True vs. Perceived Changes in Arrival Rates
A. Impact of Arrival Rates on Duration
B. Impact of Heterogeneity on LT Incidence
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Figure F1: Comparative Statics: True vs. Perceived Changes in Arrival Rates (continued)
C. Impact of Depreciation on LT Incidence
Notes: Panel A plots the average unemployment duration as a function of actual and perceived arrival rates, changing
them in the same way for all types relative to the baseline model. Panel B plots the share of long-term unemployment (i.e.,
the share of unemployed workers who are unemployed for longer than 6 months) as a function of the spread of true arrival
rates (while preserving the mean arrival rate) and the correlation between the perceived and true arrival rates. Panel C
plots the share of long-term unemployment as a function of the true and perceived depreciation rate. The output in the
last two panels corresponds to results (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1.
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